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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The question of why public relations should be 
involved in business recessions is perhaps best answered by 
saying that recessions are still another area where public 
opinion is becoming more important in this contemporary 
society. 
A recession is a kind of crisis situation and typi-
cally arouses public opinion. But today, more than ever, 
public opinion is stirred during a business decline as news 
and information of every incipient economic tendency is 
spread rapidly and uniformly throughout the country. 
The 1957-58 recession, the subject of this study, 
illustrates well the trend toward broader, more comprehen-
sive news coverage of current economic slumps. That reces-
sion was widely publicized and the vast public attention it 
received caused one news writer to quip that 11never had a 
stwnbling economy been so widely discussed or vigilantly 
watched ••• it was Topic A from club car to subway strap. 11 1 
Since public relations men monitor and prepare a 
large portion of business news, a contemporary recession has 
1 
"The Morning After, 11 Time, (lvlarch 24, 1958), 
pp. 96-100. 
obvious implications in the general area of publicity, and 
is, in fact, one facet of public relations involvement in 
business recessions to be considered in this study. But 
publicity is only one phase of public relations and there 
seemed to be some feeling that the recession had deeper 
public relations implications. This particular view was 
expressed by one public relations executive during the 
recession. 
It must be contended with considerable force 
that the recovery from the decline itself has 
rather heavy overtones in the field of public 
relations. This is due to the fact that public 
psychology and confidence are such powerful 
forces in determining the amount of goods which 
consumers will purchase, and, equally important, 
the extent to which business will risk new 
capital to meet what it estimates to be likely 
consumer demand.2 
2 
The point which this executive seems to make--and one 
that is central to this study--is that in the present economy, 
both consumers and businessmen can make economic decisions 
that count. To state it another way, the attitudes and 
opinions (the bases for most decisions) of millions, not just 
a select few, can conceivably shape this country's economic 
fortunes. Thus, the matter of favorably influencing atti-
tudes and opinions (e.g., building public confidence during a 
recession), which is basic to all public relations activities, 
takes on special significance when bad business conditions 
develop today. 
2Harold Brayman, 11The Challenge of Today," Public 
Relations Journal, (May 19.58), pp. 12-14 & 16. 
3 
I. DISCRETION IN ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
This contention requires elaboration since traditional 
business cycle theory gives considerable attention to fac-
tors that are distinctly non-psychological. Economists in 
the past have generally viewed the consumer and businessman 
simply as economic elements in an impersonal market place. 
Such theories, of course, still have some validity. But 
economists have increasingly called on psychology to round 
out their theories as the businessman and particularly the 
consumer attain greater degrees of discretion in their 
economic behavior. 
Consumer discretion. The consumer has only recently 
evolved as a decision-maker. At one time, economists could 
predict with confidence how people would spend their money 
since the vast majority of consumers spent nearly all their 
incomes on necessities, having only a little to spare for 
purchases that were not absolutely essential. But conswner 
spending is no longer bound so tightly by needs and income. 
The consumer has considerably more latitude of action; his 
economic behavior has become more significant. 
This new consumer stature or power has been widely 
discussed and studied. George Katona, Director of the 
Economics Behavior Section at the University of Michigan, has 
been conducting studies and writing books on consumer behavior 
for several years. Katona maintains that consumer 11 demand is 
4 
a function both of ability to buy--that is, of income, 
assets, debts, etc.--and of willingness to buy--that is, of 
changes in optimism or pessimism, confidence or uncertainty, 
feelings of security or insecurity."3 
Katona, a proponent of economic psychology, thus 
assigns considerable importance to psychological factors in 
shaping consumer behavior and believes that intervening 
variables (consumer attitudes, opinions, expectations, etc.) 
play an especially important role in determining how much 
the consumer is willing to spend for discretionary items 
like durable goods and other postponable purchases.4 
l\atona cites several recent changes that have given 
consumer attitudes more power. The principal one is that 
growing numbers of people are receiving what he describes as 
"supernumerary" incomes--incomes beyond the outlay for 
necessities-- which give them substantial discretion of 
action.5 Statistically, some twenty and one-half million 
American families were found to have supernumerary incomes 
3George Katona, "The Psychology of the Recession," 
Speech Delivered at the Convention of the American Psycho-
logical Association, September 1, 1958, pp. 1-2. 
4George Katona, The Powerful Consmaer, (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1960), p. ~ 
5.!£.!2.., pp. 12-13. 
5 
in 1957 as compared to twelve million in 1944. 6 In 
addition to larger incomes, conslliners have greater liquid 
reserves, can easily obtain credit to buy additional goods, 
and may all be influenced by the same economic information 
at the same time. Also, they spend increasingly for durable 
goods and other discretionary items.7 
These changes in the consumer role affect our economy 
today. There exists now a vast industrial complex engaged 
in the production of durable goods, and the well-being of 
the economy depends heavily on how this sector fares. If, 
for example, a consumer majority decides to buy fewer dur-
able goods, it is conceivable that this action will have 
decided deflationary impact on the economy. As Katona 
states: "Relatively small changes in discretionary spending 
may make the difference between an upturn and downturn. 118 
Business discretion. It has long been recognized 
that businessmen are in a position to make economic 
decisions that may collectively affect economic fluctuations. 
To some degree, however, the businessman's discretion is 
limited by his competitive position. He is often compelled 
to 11 follow the pack 11 , i. e., do as his competitors do, or 
suffer the possible consequence of business failure. 
But in spite of the competitive limitation the 
businessman still has considerable discretion which is often 
7~., p. 14. 8 l£.!..c!·, p. 21. 
6 
exercised when bad business conditions develop. He may, for 
example, reduce inventories, cut back production schedules 
and lay off workers. He may, also, introduce severe cost-
cutting or austerity programs aimed at reducing overhead 
expenses. 
Some will argue that even these business decisions 
are 11 automatic 11 responses to market conditions. But it is 
doubtful, allowing even for the wealth of precise economic 
information available to a top executive, that the attitudes 
and opinions of the executive himself do not color these 
business decisions. 
Business, particularly big business, is a position 
analogous to the consumer with a "supernumerary" income. 
The typical large corporation makes substantial profits and 
has heavy credit reserves. And the corporation, like the 
consumer, can easily obtain credit. In short, the affluency 
of the modern corporation enables its executives to have 
considerable latitude in their economic decisions, just as 
the more secure economic position of the consumer allows him 
a broader range of decisions. 
II. ANTI-RECESSION MEA.SUHES 
Because the attitudes of consumers and businessmen 
are more important and because these attitudes may be 
influenced on a broad scale, any measures to combat a 
business recession must have both a favorable economic and 
psychological impact. To cite Katona: 
Anti-recession measures may be intended to gen-
erate additional income or greater confidence. In 
order to be effective, anti-recession measures 
must serve both purposes. Appeals and moral 
suasion alone do not work. Likewise, additional 
income provided by government expenditures which 9 create mistrust and anxiety cannot prove helpful. 
In this paper we deal primarily with anti-recession 
measures intended to generate greater confidence through 
appeals and moral suasion. Such efforts were carried on by 
the goverrunent, by national industrial organizations, by 
business concerns and by community organizations--and each 
one of these groups had a public relations arm to assist in 
these undertakings. 
The nature and extent of these efforts were varied. 
In some cases they were limited to public statements by the 
leaders of these organizations while in others they 
involved elaborate "confidence-building'' programs. 
In the following chapter we will consider the nature 
of the 1957-58 recession to provide a framework for dis-
cussion of the basic appeals by numerous organizational 
leaders that appeared in various publications. Since news-
papers, magazines and other methods of mass communications 
do devote considerable space to recession matters, the 
9George Katona, "The Psychology of the Recession," 
£E.· cit., p. 16. 
7 
8 
organizations involved are thrust into the public limelight. 
The leaders of these organizations have an opportunity to 
pass their comments freely through the many channels of mass 
communications available. What they say and how they say it 
may favorably influence feelings of insecurity and help to 
restore confidence. 
The more direct and extensive efforts to promote con-
fidence--namely, the confidence-building and promotional 
programs--are considered separately in the third chapter. 
III. OTHER RECESSION CHALLENGES 
Aside from helping to restore public confidence in 
the national economy, a recession offers two other distinct 
public relations challenges. One involves the public 
relations man's obligation to the interest group he repre-
sents and is well stated by one public relations executive. 
The recession has been a factor of behavior in 
industry, goverTh~ent and labor. Each used it for 
his own purposes. Labor used it to strengthen 
its own platform; industry used it to point out 
the matter of long-term declining profits and 
government, caught in a dilemma, had to stress 
the over-riding problem of inflation in our 
economy. Each had to do certain things using 
the facts of a changing economic situation, and 
each was armed with a public relations counsel 
to help handle certain problems.lO 
Thus, public relations helps to articulate and spread 
certain organizational themes and creeds on the underlying 
lOGeorge Hammond, President, Carl Byoir & Associates, 
New York City, Personal Interview, August 15, 1958, New Yorl{ 
City. 
''causes" of business recessions; it, also, helps to defend 
organizations under "public opinion'' attacks resulting from 
the recession situation, These themes and conflicting 
interests will be discussed in chapter two when we consider 
the various organizational appeals. 
9 
Declining sales during a business recession offer 
another public relations challenge, Business executives 
today are looking beyond their sales and marketing depart-
ments for assistance in promoting and selling their products. 
This is particularly true when a company's sales are hard-
hit by a business slump. 
Public relations can help by advising and assisting 
the company's marketing force. It can also support pro-
motion and sales programs with ideas and actions. In chapter 
three we discuss some product-promotion effort. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RECESSION, PREVAILING SENTIMENTS 
AND BASIC APP£ALS 
The 1957-58 recession was the third--and probably 
the worst--post-war business decline. It began roughly in 
August, 1957, when production, employment and income peaked 
after a three-year economic advance. 1 Thereafter, the 
recession began to develop--slowly at first--then picked up 
considerable momentum. In April, 1958, one news magazine 
reported that there was virtual unanimity among economists 
that the slump was more serious than the two previous 
recessions after the war. 2 
I. NATURE OF THE RECESSION 
Business investment ~ defense spending. The 
impact of the decline, popularly referred to as a 11durable 
goods" recession, was principally upon employment and pro-
duction in durable goods manufacturing. Unemployment 
hovered around the five-million mark during the serious 
stages of the recession. This was nearly seven percent of 
lcommittee for Economic Development, Anti-Recession 
Policy for 1958, A Statement Prepared by the'""'PrOgram Com-
mittee or-commTttee for Economic Development, (New York: 
Committee for Economic Development, March, 1958), p. 10. 
211How the Slump Got This Way, 11 Business ~, (Apri 1 
5' 19 58) ' pp. 25-28. 
11 
the labor force out of work, which was considerably more 
than in the 1953-54 downturn, slightly more than in the 
1948-49 recession.3 The index of industrial production fell 
from the fall of 1957 to the spring of 1958 from 145-126.4 
At the August peak business had already begun to 
reduce its expenditures for plant and equipment, mainly the 
latter. There was a leveling-off of such expenditures and 
an actual reduction in the fourth quarter of 1957. Business 
investment programs for 1958 called for further contractions 
in such outlays.5 In fact, there was an estimated thirteen 
percent decline in expenditures for plant and equipment in 
1958, as compared to 1957. 6 Fortune described the slump in 
capital-goods buying as the 11 focal point of the recession.••7 
At the same time business investment for plant and 
equipment was declining, the government restricted its 
spending for defense. Defense spending, which had edged up 
up in 1957's first eight months to a yearly rate of $42 
3 11The Morning After, 11 Time, (March 24, 1958), 
pp. 96-100. ----
4George Katona, The Powerful Consumer, (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1960), p. 3TI7 
5couuni ttee for Economic Development, 1oc. cit. 
6Marcus Nadler, 11When and How the Upturn Wi 11 Come, 11 
Nation 1 .s Business, (June 1958), pp. 32-33. 
7 11Business Roundup," Fortune, (Apr! 1 1958), p. 45. 
billion, was cut to an annual rate of $36 billion.8 
Business ~ reported: 
Though these defense cutbacks were small in 
relation to total private expenditures, they were 
widely publicized and had important effects on 
conslli~er and business confidence. They gave what 
was left of the boom its coup de grace. The 
country felt the chill of a crTSis of confidence 
--aggravated by the concern over the first two 
Russian Sputniks and the President's illness.9 
12 
Consumer spending. Consumer expenditures, which 
represent close to two-thirds of all expenditures, remained 
surprisingly strong during the recession.lO Retail sales 
for the year were two percent ahead of 1957.11 However, 
consumers tool{ a major rift in their spending for durable 
goods. From the first, automobiles did not sell well in 
1958; later, consumer purchases of household equipment also 
declinect.l2 People spent substantially the same on food and 
necessities as a year earlier, and spending on luxury items 
(e.g., entertainment, vacations) increased somewhat during 
the recession.l3 
8 11 The Mornina After, 11 1 oc. cit. 
~ --- ---
9 11How the Slump Got This Way," loc. cit. 
10Katona, ~· ill·• p. 18. 
llNew ~Times, August 6, 1958, p. 33 
12Katona, ~· s!l·• p. 5o. 
13Ibid. 
13 
There were conflicting views on the extent of con-
sumer savings during the recession. The Commerce Depart-
ment report on 1958•s first quarter savings showed that con-
sumers not only increased their savings but spent a little 
more out of their incomes than in any quarter of the pre-
vious year. Meanwhile, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
reported that savings of the cash-type savings accounts, 
Government savings bonds and life insurance were at a 
record rate--higher even than the war-time peak reached in 
1944. The source said that the 11Home Loan Bank Board figure 
is probably more reflective of actual saving-spending 
decisions of consumers." It showed, according to the 
account, 11 that large numbers of people decided to save 
rather than spend" during the recession.l4 
Consumer ability to buy remained strong throughout 
the recession as the result of wage increases, automatically 
provided through long-term union contracts, and government 
transfer paymen ts--soci a 1 security, unemployment compen-
sation, etc. However, consumer willingness to buy was 
impaired. There was little favorable economic news which 
might encourage the consumer to accept long-term contractual 
obligations or risk liquid reserves for automobiles or major 
household appliances. Said Katona: "It appears when the 
14New York Times, June 24, 1958, p. 21. 
news about declining automobile sales reached the people, 
willingness to buy cars dropped sharply. 11 15 
Inventory reductions. The leveling and subsequent 
reductions in hard-goods sales, coupled with much sharper 
14 
reductions in new orders, made inventories seem excessive, 
especially at the manufacturer's leve1.16 And by April of 
1958, inventory buying plunged from a $2-blllion rate of 
accumulation to an $8-blllion rate of liquidation.l7 Inven-
tory accumulation in the early stages of the recession 
helped to absorb some of the economy's output. But with the 
shift from accumulation to liquidation of inventories there 
were substantial drops in national product.l8 
Other factors. This, in broad terms, is what hap-
pened during the 1957-58 recession. The severity of the 
decline was due mainly to a simultaneous restriction of 
business and consumer investment. Government reductions in 
defense spending and ''tight money" policies may have added 
fuel to the recession fire. Slumps in U. S. sales abroad 
and a slight sag in residential housing construction were 
other deflationary factors. And many seemed to think that 
15Katona, ££· sll·• p. 215. 
16committee For Economic Development, lac. cit. 
17 11Business Roundup, 11 lac. cit. 
lBcommittee for Economic Development, ~· ~., p. 11. 
15 
the success of the Russian Sputniks and the President's ill-
ness, two events which occurred when the economy was falter-
ing, helped to undermine public confidence. 
II. PREVAILING SENTIMENTS 
The 1957-58 business recession was the first really 
serious economic downturn this country has experienced since 
1937. The economic situation, especially during the grim 
winter months of 1958, was considered very serious. The New 
York Times reported in June, 1958, that "two leading econo-
mists, writing in early April, told Congress the nation was 
probably in for a major depression."l9 
Despite the bleak economic picture, neither consumers 
nor businessmen were inordinately concerned about the reces-
sion. This is not to say that the recession was not a dis-
turbing situation for many people. It was. However, there 
was little or no evidence of panic at any level. 
In a nation-wide survey of conslliuer attitudes and 
expectations about three-quarters of upper-income people said 
that a depression like that of the thirties would not or 
could not happen.20 
19~ York Times, June 1, 1958, p. 51. 
20George Katona, "The Psychology of the Recession," 
Speech at the Convention of the American Psychological 
Association, September 1, 1958, p. 5. 
Reasons for confidence. One explanation for these 
sanguine attitudes is that people in general have profited 
from the experiences of war and frequent economic slumps. 
Fortune has this observation on businessmen: 
.•• the confidence that U. S. business has 
acquired in its own economic system by living 
through a depression, two wars, two postwar 
recessions, and a long boom was clearly dis-
cernible. In itself, this confidence was 
undoubtedly having a braking effect on the 
recession.21 
People, too, have acquired greater confidence in the 
Federal GoverThnent 1 s ability and power to prevent an 
economic crisis. Many people today are no doubt confident 
16 
that the goverThnent can, in fact, prevent a deep depression. 
Businessmen may be somewhat more skeptical of the effective-
ness of government anti-recession measures but they surely 
find considerable comfort in the stabilizers that have been 
built into the economy by the government. They also know 
that the government can act to help the economy, as this 
statement which appeared during the 1957-58 recession 
reflects: 
Executives were convinced that this Republican 
Administration would use credit, taxes, spending--
whatever is necessary--to fight any threat of real 
depression. However, there was little inclination 
to think that government action alone would rein-
vigorate business.22 
21George B. Bookman, 11How Top Businessmen View the 
Hecession, 11 Fortune, (April 1958), p. 110. 
22rbid., p. 111. 
The prosperous post-war era in itself has fostered 
attitudes which add to the country's economic resiliancy. 
Feelings of confidence and security have prevailed. Accord-
ing to survey findings, people believe that both their 
incomes and standards of living will be higher or the same 
in the next five or ten years.23 
Self-reinforcing features of bad~· People's 
long-range views of the economy were basically unchanged by 
the recession, but feelings of insecurity about the short-
range possibilities of the economy did develop. In a recent 
book, The Powerful Consuner, Katona discusses the 1957-SS 
recession. He says mainly that the developments during the 
decline were cunulative and self-reinforcing.24 
He traces the cutbacks in capital expenditures, 
inventories and production from 1957's last quarter through 
the more advanced stages of the recession. In each case, he 
said, bad news was self-reinforcing. 'ilhen information that 
other businessmen were also cutting back their investments 
and production reached the entrepreneur, they repeated the 
same measures--only to a greater extent. He describes the 
reductions in steel production as "reinforcement in action. 1125 
23Katona, £E· cit., p. 4. 
24!\atona, The Powerful Consumer, £E· cit., pp. 212-
213. 
'The extent of curtailment in steel production 
can only be explained in terms of businessmen and 
consumers "overdoing" what they began to do. 
Pessimistic expectations of business managers fed 
upon reduced demand by consumers; pessimistic 
expectations of consumers were reinforced by news 
of the effects of business inventory policies, 
and so on.26 
J{atona said, also, that 11 broad groups of consumers 
18 
were likewise subject to cumulative adverse expectations" 
••• and that 11by December, 1957, consumers on the whole were 
fairly pessimistic. 11 27 He adds: 
Consumer purchases of automobiles and other 
durables were, however, curtailed only slightly 
in the last quarter (1957). Somewhat later, 
vmen news spread about substantial increases in 
unemployment, consumers found their expectations 
j~sti~~ed and responded with much greater inten-
slty. 
Saliency oz bad ~· Katona argues that consumers 
constantly need new evidence to support their optimism. He 
says that the bad news about business and government expen-
ditures was salient despite such good news as record personal 
incomes and a high level of consumer spending. 11ThourJh ;11any 
... people admitted they, themselves, were well off, they 
became worried about their own jobs and incomes," he said.29 
The failure of prices to yield under recession 
pressures also disturbed many people. Prices of automobiles 
p. 8. 
26~., p. 216. 27Ibid. 2 ,, 0 Ibid. 
29Katona, "The Psychology of the Recession, 11 2.£· cit., 
19 
and other hard goods, in particular, continued to rise dur-
ing the recession. The unprecedented combination of infla-
tion and recession most certainly had an impact on consw.1er 
spending decisions.JO 
Incoming orders probably influenced business thini{-
ing more than any other single factor. When orders dropped, 
businessmen began to worry about the economic health of the 
nation. Businessmen were also concerned by growing unem-
plo~nent, by sales and costs problems and by the squeeze on 
their own profits.31 
III. BASIC APPEALS 
Economic recessions have traditionally been a 
business problem. In the past, it was generally felt that 
it was up to the members of the business community to work 
out tile solutions when business declined. The government 
had little voice, unions virtually no say-so. 
A contemporary recession is, of course, still essen-
tially a business problem. However, both the government and 
unions now have the power to make their opinions count, too. 
As noted earlier, people today have considerable confidence 
in the government's ability to cope with the problems of 
economic recessions. 
30Ibid., p. 16. 31Bookman, £E· cit., p. 8. 
20 
Shortly after the 1957-58 recession had developed, 
President Eisenhower, in a State of the Union message, pro-
claimed: 
••• it is my conviction that the underlying forces 
of growth remain strong and undiminished. As a 
nation, we must provide the needs of a population 
growing at three million a year. Billions of 
dollars are being spent every year on research and 
development that will mean new products and jobs. 
Overseas economic development will provide growing 
markets for our resources. The future will belong, 
not to the fainthearted, but to those who believe 
in it and prepare for it.32 
The initial Eisenhower statement on the recession set 
the tone for subsequent government claims and actions. An 
early upturn--about March--was continually predicted and the 
government followed a consistently conservative anti-
recession policy. 
Businessmen, while skeptical of the President's pre-
diction for an early upturn, were generally aligned with the 
government position, seeing neither the need nor the urgency 
for massive government intervention.33 
Union leaders were less philosophical about business 
conditions. Many of their constituents were laid-off or out 
of a job, so they pressed for increased unemployment compen-
sation, tax cuts, public works spending and other remedial 
measures by the goverrunent. 
32 11The President on Business," U. S. News & World 
Report, (February 21, 1958), pp. 82-83~ 
33Bookman, ££• ~·· p. 110. 
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Government position. The government's recession 
appeals were, of course, tempered by many factors. For 
example, prior to the onset of the 1957-58 recession, one of 
the major economic problems confronting the Eisenhower Alli~in­
istration was inflation. Prices spiraled upward during a 
three-year period of economic prosperity following the 1954 
recession and the Administration was still taking anti-
inflation actions when the recession developed. With 
inflation problems still fresh and the stickiness of prices 
in spite of recession, the government was inclined to move 
cautiously when the decline began. Most goverTh~ent state-
ments on the recession situation generally stressed the 
underlying problem of inflations, and at the same time were 
intended to remind the people of the basic strengths of the 
American economy. 
The government's statements and actions were also 
governed to some degree by political considerations. The 
Hepublican position is fundamentally conservative and 
Eisenhower himself repeatedly affirmed his conviction that 
the Federal Goverrunent should use its power sparingly in 
dealing with problems of recession. In addition, the 
Eisenhower Administration had made the campaign promise of a 
balanced budget. To plunge large sums into the economy for 
anti-recession purposes would have shattered any hopes of 
the government to put its fiscal house in order. 
22 
The experience of the 1953-54 recession may also have 
affected government attitudes on the recession. One writer 
mentions this in connection with a tax cut, which was widely 
discussed during the 1957-58 decline. 
The tax cut then ( 1953-54 recession) came about 
through the expiration of existing legislation. 
It thus required the acceptance rather than the 
initiation of action, and between Arthur Burn's 
gentle urging that spending should be speeded up 
and Secretary Hllinphrey 1 s reluctant acquiescence in 
such a course, the recession ended quickly. No 
radical measures had been necessary, and the 
gloom-and-doom boys had been proved wrong again.3L> 
Business position. During the recession, business had 
a golden opportunity to express its views and opinions on the 
economic situation. 
Business also got a chance to grind some old axes. 
Representatives from virtually every phase of the business 
world were queried by a myriad of business writers, and not 
infrequently, businessmen were permitted to speak for them-
selves in the columns of some of the more widely circulated 
publications. 
The business spokesmen seemed to use this 11 space 11 to 
advantage. Pet problems were rehashed with a recession twist: 
government controls, high taxes, inflation, unions--all these 
issues and several others were incorporated in their discus-
sions. Often, the business authors sought to deal directly 
34Hans H. Landsberg, •~,~e Cannot Afford This Recession," 
The Reporter, (May 15, 1958), p. 11. 
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with the recession problem by suggesting ways the reader 
himself could help to halt--or at least slow down--the 
decline. 
Business remained consistently conservative in 
expressing its views on government intervention. Basically, 
it voiced the old theme that there should be as little 
government tampering with the economic mechanism as 
possible. 
This statement by a leading executive in the durable 
goods industry typifies what business had to say about the 
goverrunent's role in the recession • 
•.• We cannot achieve a swift and steady recovery 
by ••. relying .•• on government stimulants, deficit 
spending, meaningless tax cuts, deliverate infla-
tion or any other economic sleight of hand.35 
Because of the extremely influential position govern-
ment occupies today, business is usually careful to include 
certain goverru~ent actions in its suggested plans for recov-
ery. One businessman said that there are important functions 
goverru~ent can perform to help recovery and cited acceler-
ation of those defense and public works programs that were 
already authorized and truly needed as positive steps. He 
also said that "in the field of taxation, tax reform rather 
than temporary tax cut is needed. 11 36 
35Ralph J. Cordiner and Sylvia Porter, 11 Two Experts 
Tell You What to Do About the Recession, 11 Life, (June 2, 
19)8)' pp. 22-23. -
36Ibid. 
Some business spokesmen were more adamant in their 
statements on government intervention, This comment 
appeared in a pamphlet published by a large stock brokerage 
firm: 
Given time, a recession cures itself through 
the liquidation of excess supply, excess debt, 
and excess pricing. Given government intervention, 
a recession drags along and leads to eventual 
inflation. This is the lesson of the 1930's and 
we are faced with a clear choice today between the 
economics of experience and the economics of 
socialism.37 
While businessmen often discussed the recession in 
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general terms, there were also some specific problems brought 
on by the slump that they had to talk about. One was 
unemployment. 
The unemployment question was an extremely touchy one. 
How, for example, does one explain to over six million people 
the reasons for their unemployment. None the less, the ques-
tion had to be dealt with in practically every recession 
discussion. 
A frequently used tactic by businessmen and economists 
in public statements on unemployment was to emphasize the 
positive side, For example: 11 ••• despite the decline in 
business activity and the rather sharp rise in unemployment, 
nearly 63 million people are still employed in civilian 
occupations.n38 
37Hayden, Stone & Co. (Investment Company), Monthly 
Inves t:nent Let tcr, (New York: Hayden, Stone & Co.), (Apri 1, 
1958), 10 pp. 
38Marcus Nadler, "When and How the Upturn Wi 11 Corne, 11 
Nation's Business, (June 1958), pp. 32-33. 
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Another related approach was used in a number of 
instances to point out that a large portion of the total 
unemployed constituted what was described as 11 bedrock 
unemployment. "39 Such unemployment is the ldnd that results 
from people's changing jobs, being temporarily laid off, not 
accepting an available job and other similar reasons. 
A corollary to this appeal to the unemployed was an 
attempt to incite those who had jobs to action--to help 
insert new life into a stumbling economy. 
What prevents inevitable and moderate down 
periods from turning into depression? The 
answer is the attitude of you and me, and the 
rest of the 62,000,000 of us who have jobs. 
The best way a man with a job can insure that 
he wi 11 have it is •.. to buy what he needs, 
wants, and can honestly afford.40 
Trying to pry more money out of the A.11erican consumer 
seemed to be management's foremost problem. There was a 
decided tendency on the conslliner•s part to save more, to 
repay debt and spend less.41 
Consumer credit, for ex amp 1 e, decreased by iH. "1 
billion during the first two months of 1958. It is interest-
ing to note, however, that disposable income--the amount of 
money people have available for purchase of goods and ser-
vices--was still rising.42 
---·---
39cordiner and Porter, loc. cit. 
40n. P. Mast, "What's the Cause of the Downturn," 
Printer's lnl{, (April 11, 1958), p. 34. 
41Nadler, loc. cit. 
i.e2 11 The Morning After, 11 Time, (lvlarch 21+, 1958), 
pp. 96-100. 
Businessmen were aware of these statistics and 
patterned their comments accordingly. 
A shift in consumer psychology .•. could quickly 
set the cash registers ringing, executives 
thought; the consumer had plenty of moneJ' to buy 
but was simply not inclined to spend it.43 
The vice president of one business corporation told 
an American Management Conference in February, 1958, that 
"psychological warfare may prove the real answer to the 
recession. 1144 
One foreign economist expressed a similar view: 
The general atmosphere in this so-called 
recession can be explained only in psychological 
terms. It seems to me that the recession has 
its roots not in economics but in some sort of 
a psychological short circuit.45 
This economist also spoke of the widespread pessi-
mism in the country, and felt that it was not justified, 
even considering the slump in the auto industry which had 
adverse effects on steel. He added that 11 it would ••• be a 
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grave fallacy to believe that the average citizen--manufac-
turer, trader, worker or consumer--cannot help or harm the 
situation. 1146 
In several instances, businessmen and economists alike 
insisted that both consumer and businessman must act 
43Bookman, l££· ~· 
44 11 Itts That Extra Enterprise, 11 Newsweek, (March 31, 
1958), pp. 79-84. 
(June 
45Ludwio Erhard, 11Practical Recession Advice, 11 _Life, 
9, 1958); pp. 47-48. 
46Ibid. 
positively. Consumers were urged to spend: 11 ••• those who 
are afraid to spend today because they are afraid of the 
future wi 11 be jeopard! zing their income of tomorrow. 1147 
Business itself was urged to spend: "It is not prudent or 
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intelligent of management to halt expansion when things are 
poor. 1148 
The responsibility of getting consumers to buy rested 
wholly upon business, especially upon those areas of business 
that were doing poorly. 
"Business," said one executive, "must concentrate on 
selling and serving the customer as never before." At the 
same time he insisted on sophisticated selling efforts--not 
just promotional or sales programs, or telling people that 
it was their 11patriotic 11 duty to buy.49 
The durables industry in particular needed imaginative 
efforts to sell their products, for they contended that they 
were caught in a bind and could not reduce the prices of 
their goods. The 11 bind 11 as described by most executives, 
was spiraling costs. 
Costs are too high to permit a cut without wiping out 
our profit margins, they protested. They also argued that 
the unprecedented combination of inflation and recession at 
the same time made it pointless to lower prices.50 
47Ibid. 48 11The Morning After, 11 loc. cit. 
49cordiner and Porter, 1££· Ell· 
50Bookman, ££· ~·· p. 254. 
Companies pressed for tighter internal economy, but 
insisted that there were some costs that were out of their 
hands, particularly wages. 
One news magazine noted that business pointed the 
finger at unions for the price situation: "The reason, 11 
(for the high costs) say businessmen, 11 is the organized 
labor philosophy that good business or bad, wages--thus 
prices--must go up every year. 1151 
During the recession, business was advised by the 
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U. 5. Chamber of Commerce that it could help speed recovery 
by stiffening its resistance to union demands for higher 
wages. 
11We can afford wage increases only when they are 
fully offset by productivity improvements," said the Cham-
ber's director of economic research.52 
An economist noted that the wages in highly organized 
mass production industries had increased faster than in 
other fields. The result, he decided, was the higher prices 
of goods produced by these industries, which were often 
beyond the buying power of the fixed income groups.53 
51 "The Morning After, 11 1.££. cit. 
52u. ~-~!World Report, (June 20, 1958), p. 91. 
53Nadler, .!££· £l!· 
One writer said most comments like this were infre-
quently heard but he got this one for the record: 1'We have 
taxes and laws to control business monopoly; we must find 
some way of sanely contra 11 ing the power of labor leaders 
to impose an unhealthy wage inflation."54 
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Occasionally businessmen referred to the recession as 
"a test of the system. 11 Recessions make for bad propaganda, 
they conunented, with the U. S. the recognized leader of the 
free world.55 
In addition, the continuing comparison of the Russian 
and American economic systems was made • 
••• It is my opinion that the American people 
will leave both the recession and Russians far 
behind. That is what the ~nerican people want. 
And we always work hard for what we want. This 
is all a country needs.56 
The majority of businessmen apparently wanted to pro-
ject a genuinely sympathetic attitude toward those people 
who had suffered as result of the recession; and they wanted 
to leave the impression that they were concerned enough to 
take constructive action. 
However, a number of executives were quoted as feel-
ing that the recession might be a 11 good thing 11--a chance for 
people, business people as well as consumers, to get back to 
earth, to cut off their debts and correct their personal and 
btusl.ness habits. 
5LJ.Bookman, ~·cit., p. 112. 55Ibid., p. 256. 
56cordiner and Porter, loc. cit. 
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One executive said he thoughtthe recession had been 
artificially created, 11overadvertised 11 , he said, "Let's not 
be fooled by it; it's probably good for usJ 1157 
Another businessman ascribing to this view said: "The 
country has gone soft, fat and flabby, and it 1 s a damn good 
thing business got bad. 1158 
Union position. Unemployment during the recession 
was heaviest in the strongly unionized durable goods manu-
facturing area. Some fifty percent of the unemployment rise 
was in basic industries (automobiles, aircraft, steel appli-
ance makers) which employ roughly twenty-three percent of 
the labor force, The service industries, which employ 
thirty-five percent, showed no recession,59 
The unemployment situation, therefore, directly 
affected many of the members of the big unions. While we 
have little data on the kinds of appeals union leaders were 
malting during the recession, it's for certain that they 
favored more liberal spending policies by the federal govern-
ment--and frequently voiced this opinion. 
In March, 1958, nearly one thousand top labor officials 
of the AFL-CIO met in Washington at the same time several 
bills for anti-recession measures were being considered, 
57Booltman, £r· ~., p. 256. 58Ibid. 
59Sumner Slichter, 11How Long Will This Recession 
Last 7, 11 The ~ Repub 1 ic, (March 3, 1958), pp. 8-10. 
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AFL-CIO President George Meany outlined tlu·ee union propos-
als on the recession.60 
1. The goverrunent should cut income taxes (for 
individuals only), liberalize unemployment bene-
fits and plunge billions extra into defense and 
public works. 
2. Organized labor must go after higher wages 
to increase consumer purchasing power. He 
cautioned union heads not 11 to let anyone te 11 you 
this is the time to hold the line on wages. 11 
J. Business should reverse its "pricing 
policy." Greater volume of sales should be 
sought by having sraaller price per item.61 
60"Unions Prescribe for a Recession," Business Week, 
(March 15, 195il), p. 127. 
6llbid. 
CHAPTER III 
ANTI-RECESSION PROGRAJ.S AND RELATED EFFORTS 
The 1957-58 recession inspired a number of confidence-
building and promotional efforts by a variety of organi-
zations. In many instances it seemed to be a case of indi-
vidual groups following Washington's lead. The President 
stressed the need for renewed confidence and many others 
picked up the cry. Slogans were devised, public-spirited 
citizens conducted confidence "rallies'' in conjunction with 
local merchants throughout the country, and nation-wide 
associations and business organizations developed elaborate 
programs intended to help promote confidence. 
Several of these efforts will be reviewed and evalu-
ated in this chapter. First to be considered is a program 
conducted by the Advertising Council, a national, non-
profit business association. 
Some efforts by industrial organizations are then 
examined. A General Electric program called "Operation 
Upturn 11 and "Operation Capacity," which was conducted by 
the Hudson Paper Pulp Company, will be reviewed, followed 
by a discussion of some product-promotion and "hard sell" 
efforts by business concerns. Finally, some community 
efforts to help restore confidence are discussed. 
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I. THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL'S PROGHAM 
The Advertising Council. The Advertising Council is 
a non-profit organization which was formed in 1942 to aid 
the government in World War II horne front drives such as 
war bonds, victory gardens, WAVE and WAC recruiting and 
numerous others. 
Since the war, the Council has continued its work, 
assisting in forest fire prevention (the Council originated 
"Smokey the Bear"), economic education, community campaigns 
and other similar endeavors, with about one hundred-sixty 
million dollars being contributed to the organization 
annually. 
The Council campaigns are supported by contributions 
from American business firms and generally prepared without 
charge by volunteer advertising and public relations 
agencies. 
"Growing America" campaign. Two notable contributions 
made by the Counci 1 in the area of national economy are a 
pair of programs it has conducted during post-war business 
recessions. The first such program was during the 19)3-S4 
decline; the second was conducted during the 19)7-58 
recession. 
Plans for the second recession-inspired campaign were 
revealed March 5, 195Cl, when representatives of McCann-
Ericl,son, Inc.--the advertising agency which volunteered to 
handle the campaign--made the initial presentation of pro-
spective campaign themes to the Advisory Corrunittee of the 
Advertising Counci 1 in New York City. 
The comments and recommendations received as a 
result of that presentation were embodied in an all-media, 
nation-wide advertising and public relations campaign 
entitled "Your Future is Great in a Growing America". The 
public relations affiliate of McCann-Erickson, which is 
Communications Counselors, Inc., offered its services to 
handle the public relations end of the campaign. 
The rationale for the program was su~~ed up in a 
speech by the co-chairman of the Advisory Committee. 
He said first that it was the Council's conviction 
that the element of public confidence was of great importance 
in preventing a recession from turning into a depression, 
and that public confidence could be influenced by 
advertising .1 
Secondly, the Council believes that the .Ar.1erican 
economy is substantially sound and dynamic, he said, and 
that a substantial amount of buying power, through fear of 
the future and the impact of bad news, had been channeled 
into savings.2 
1Remarks by Charles G. Mortimer, President, General 
Foods Co., (Undated material distributed by the Advertising 
Council, New York, N. Y.). 
2 Ibid. 
He concluded that the Council believes that if its 
information campaign could maintain and strengthen public 
confidence, the minimur;; effect would be to offset the 
impact of the bad news, and at most, the campaign could 
mark a psychological turning point from which the whole 
direction of the economy could be turned upward.3 
As in other programs conducted by the Council, it 
relied on mass dissemination of facts and arguments, pri-
marily through advertising. The facts were based mostly 
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on updated figures of a survey that an economist affiliated 
with IJlcCann-Ericl,son had done for the Council during the 
1953-54 recession. Statistics were secured from the u. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.4 
This information was used in framing seven basic 
points that could be used for wide public dissemination. 
Each one emphasized a positive economic aspect that 
~dicated future growth and economic strength. Cited, for 
example, in nearly all the Council literature for the cam-
paign were favorable employment figures, population 
statistics, production increases, research efforts and other 
similar appeals. 
3Ibid. 
4Theodore S. Repplier, uRX for a Short Recession: No 
Panic,'' Look, ~ovember 11, 1958), pp. 51-52. 
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The Council program, which began April 10, 1958, was 
to run for a four-month period. But because of favorable 
public reaction and reception, said a Council spokesman, it 
c' 
was decided to extend the campaign another four months.:> 
In addition, a status report in August revealed that 
media representatives were giving the program very favorable 
treatment. The total value of the media ti1ne and space, 
which was given freely, was later estimated at nearly twenty 
million dollars.6 
Public relations effort. A public relations and 
publicity campaign was run in conjunction with the public 
service advertising. The reported primary objective of the 
public relations effort was to replace some of the bad news, 
which had been appearing in newspapers, with more optimistic 
business reports. It was the Council's contention that bad 
news, lil{e "recession fever", generally tends to feed on 
itself.7 
The public relations affiliate for the campaign 
assisted on several tasks. Along with preparing a weekly 
round-up of 11 good news" to be distributed by the Council news 
bureau, the public relations counsel prepared a speaker's 
kit, an editorial writer's kit and a fact sheet on the Council 
. 8 campa1gn. 
5Advertising Council, Status Re~ort, Confidence in a 
Growing ,\merica Campaion, (New York: A vertis1ng Council;-
August -11, 1958), p. 6. 
6rbid. 7rbid. 
BRay l\ollenborn, President, Communications Counselors, 
Inc., New Yorl{, N.Y., Personal Interview, August 13, 1958. 
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Industry ~rticipation. Several large industrial 
firms adopted the general theme of the Advertising Council's 
campaign in promotion and/or public relations efforts 
during the recession. The Council encouraged business firms 
to tie-in with their program. A Council spokesman said that 
individual action by private concerns extended the campaign 
out of the media and put it more on a personalized selling 
basis. 9 
One of the first industrial firms to identify with 
the Council program was the Sinclair Oil Corporation. 
Sinclair built the Council crunpaign message into a 
saturation spot radio campaign it had been conducting for 
two years in the company's thirty-six-state marketing terri-
tory. Sinclair, which had been tying its gasoline sales 
pitch to the safe-driving theme in its spot announcements, 
changed the spot to read: "Your Future is Great in a Growing 
.America--remember to drive with care and use Sinclair. 11 10 
Sinclair's advertising manager explained further 
adaptations of the Council's program: 
Newspapers were considered a natural follow-
through and the most effective way of spreading 
the message to important medium size cities and 
small towns was through Sinclair's widely used 
cooperative advertising plan. r,!ore than 1,564 
9Maxwell Fox, Director of Public Helations, Advertis-
ing Council, New Yorl,, N. Y., Personal Interview, August 12, 
1958. 
lOAdvertising Council, Sinclair's Participation in the 
Advertisin; Counci 1 •s Campaign, (New Yori{: Advertising 
Counc 1 I ) , pp. 
Sinclair wholesalers and dealers use newspapers 
and share the cost with the company. An Ad 
Council ad was made available to everyone of 
these participants.ll 
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Sinclair's marketing department used the Council 
theme around which to build what they described as 11 a tough, 
shoe-leather selling campaign. 11 12 Such a campaign, they 
said, needed two requisites: 
1) something to restore confidence and enthusiasm 
to a marketing organization that was facing a decline 
in its commercial busines~and 2) a theme that would 
lend itself to a program that would compel Sinclair 
salesmen, and its marketers, jobbers and distributors 
to go out on the pavements and make a record number 
of calls.l3 
One of the first steps was to prepare literature which 
gave optimistic forecasts of increased demand for petrol. 
The literature, distributed to salesmen, marketers, jobbers, 
and distributors, carried the optimistic message that 
petroleum demand would grow from 8,880,000 barrels daily in 
1956 to 14,300,000 barrels daily by 1966. Sinclair was, in 
other words, making the "Growing America" theme specific to 
the oil industry.l4 
One Sinclair representative said that 11 by focusing 
salesmen's eyes on this strong probability of dramatic future 
growth, Sinclair felt it had the key to a restoration of con-
fidence and enthusiasm for its marketing organization."l5 
llibid. 12Ibid. 13Ibid. 14Ibid. 
15J. E. Gorman, Assistant Advertising Manager, Sinclair 
Refining Company, Personal Interview, New York City, August 
11' 1958. 
The next problem was how to blend this confidence 
into a program to compel calls, according to a Sinclair 
statement.l6 
This, they said, was accomplished by equipping each 
salesman with a supply of des~' pen sets of four ball-point 
pens--red, green, black and blue--and a pen-holder. These 
four pens were to be the basis of four calls by each Sin-
clair salesman on as many prospective accounts as he could 
find in his territory.l7 
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Each pen represented an historical economic event in 
the nation's growth. The story of each was printed on a 
small card keyed to the color of each of the pen sets.l8 
The salesman presented one card and the appropriate 
pen during each of his four calls. On his first call he 
also presented the pen-holder. The red card, for example, 
described how discovery of the first oil well sparked new 
industry to an extent never dreamed of:l9 
As oil proved to be a vital economic necessity, 
men went into the laboratory for research and 
testing to devise better fuels and lubricants 
needed for a mechanized, motorized age ••• to keep 
62,000,000 vehicles moving on the highways today. 
As in the past, new discoveries will mean a great 
many new jobs in completely new industries. As 
things now look, red ink, symbolized by this pen, 
is passing from the business scene. It signifies 
our confidence in business.20 
16Advertising Council, Sinclair's Particioation 
Advertising Council's Campaign,~· c1t. 
17Ibid. 181bid. 19Ibid. 20Ibid, 
in the 
Each card, in turn, told its own story of America's 
dynamic growth: 
The green pen with green in!{ symbo 1 i zed new 
prosperity ••• more 'greenbacks' and higher standards 
of living for us all. The black pen pointed out 
that accounts are going to be in the black! Here's 
your third pen ••• in black ink! The blue pen con-
notes that the future is brighter than ever ••• we 
are part of it. The b 1 ue in!{ is the fourth pen 
and tells us that for the businessman the sky is 
the 1 imit. 21 
'0 Lf 
Sinclair adopted the Counci 1 campaign theme in other 
ways. It ran an advertisement supp 1 ied by the Counc i 1 in 
the company house organ, which it distributed to customers 
and prospective customers; it carried a story of the company's 
participation in the program in the company dealer magazine, 
and it distributed Council ad reprints to dealers for dis-
play in the service station windows.22 
The Kraft Foods Company was another active partici-
pant in the Advertising Council program. The president of 
the firm sent a letter to some two thousand !{ey Kraft people 
which outlined how they could help create an atmosphere of 
confidence by following the Advertising Council's sug-
gestions. 23 
Kraft also distributed a bulletin on the confidence 
campaign to all members of the Kraft credit union--and reached 
non-company people by using the Council's confidence symbol 
and slogan on its postal meter for outgoing rnai 1.21+ 
22lbid. 
23Advcrtising Council, Business Promotion of the Con-
fidence Campaign, (New York: Advert1s1ng Council)-,-ln:-pp:-
2i+Ibid. 
L> 1 
Plant and city advertising was used by some companies 
to disseminate and localize the more positive aspects of the 
U. 5. economy. Continental Can Company, for example, used 
an ad stating the concern was spending ~~15 million during 
1957 on research and other millions to improve plant 
faci lities.25 
The General Foods Corporation appealed to its stock-
holders by mailing the Council campaign booklet with quar-
terly dividend payments. The company also asked its radio 
and television stars to offer the booklet to their 
audiences.26 
The United States Steel Company used television to 
help put across the Council's confidence message. In June, 
1958, a film called "Confidence in America" was shown on the 
"United States Steel Hour." Beginning with the Panic of 
1907, script and images related the story of America's 
increasing prosperity in spite of recession, a major depres-
sion and two world wars.27 
Prudential Insurance Company produced a two-minute 
film on "Confidence in a Growing America" and used it on the 
television program "Twentieth Century 11 ••• The Chicago Federal 
Savings and Loan Association sponsored a color telecast on 
the recession and rebroadcast the sound portion on radio ••• 
The National Gas Council distributed free mats to every 
25Ibid. 26Ibid, 27Ibid. 
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weekly and most small town newspapers in the country. These 
mats were cartoons on the 11Changing Scene 11 , illustrating 
America's material progress between 1908 and 1958.28 
Views ~ ~ program's effectiveness. In August, the 
director of public relations for the Advertising Council and 
the President of Communications Counselors, Inc., were inte~ 
viewed by this writer and asked several questions pertinent 
to the Council's recession campaign. 
Both were asked how effective they thought the program 
had been in building confidence and encouraging people to 
buy. The two spokesmen seemed to think that the program had 
been effective but were hesitant to make positive claims of 
results. This hesitancy is understandable since the program 
was intended to influence the attitudes and opinions of large 
segments of the American population. To gauge how success-
fully this was done would require extensive and costly 
research, and even then it would be difficult to discover the 
cause-and-effect relationships. 
In cownenting on the public relations end of the pro-
gram, the president of Communications Counselors, Inc., said: 
I think public relations and publicity helped 
but to what extent I am not sure ••• I don't mean 
to enter into an economic discussion but we all 
know that confidence is an important factor, 
especially when disposable income remained high, 
but was being channeled off into soft goods and 
savings. We have this thing called state of 
mind ••• and it is undoubtedly in this area that 
public relations and advertising played its 
share in combating fear with those who had no 
reason to fear.29 
The executive recalled 11how black things looked in 
the early days of the recession as compared with the 
present (August 1958). 11 30 
When we started every headline played up the 
bad news about the economy ••• The Ad Council 
seems to think that our good news program 
helped to reverse this trend ••• I feel that 
advertising and public relations helped to 
re-establish confidence in a public which had 
disposable Income to dispose of.3l 
The Advertising Council representative said that in 
the current program it was more difficult to get figures 
which in some way show results than in previous Council 
campaigns.32 
He had these views on the effectiveness of the pro-
grams: 
••• in regard to our campaign, as it started 
and developed, the attitude of people as expressed 
in the newspaper seemed to turn upward. In June 
we began to notice the change from bad news. We 
have been putting out good news about the economy 
at the rate of one release a day, just recently 
calling a halt to that effort. Criticism has been 
so positive, constructive and laudatory that it 
has been ~~azing. Actually we expected a number 
of complaints accusing the boys of Madison Avenue 
of trying to talk us out of a recession, but there 
have been few received.33 
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29Kollenborn, personal interview, loc. cit. 30Ibid. 
31~. 32Fox, personal interview, loc. cit. 
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II , OPERATION UPTURN 
110peration Upturn" was a recession-inspired program 
conducted by General Electric Corporation from ivlay through 
October of 1958. Although the recession and the resultant 
sales slump seriously affected the durable goods manufac-
turer, General Electric, company officials insisted that 
110peration Upturn" should not be interpreted as a 11 fight 
the recession" program,34 
The company also said that the program was not one 
that should be thought of as a price-cutting campaign and 
explained their motives for this tact thusly: 
This is not a price-cutting campaign. We feel 
that nothing destroys confidence like cutting 
prices. People soon get the impression that 
prices are on their way down and postpone pur-
chases. Price is but one of many, many factors 
in the market place.35 
General Electric reported that it decided to conduct 
a company-wide program of aggressive action after careful 
review of the economic situation. Company officials con-
eluded that the worst of the recession was over in March and 
that the program should accelerate the upturn in business by 
bringing 11 extra values'' to customers in hopes of building 
sales and jobs in 1958.36 
34General Electric, O~eration Upturn ~ Book, (New 
Yor\{: General Electric), p. ·, 
35L. W. O'Brien, Counci 1 Secretary of "Operation 
Upturn, 11 Personal Interview, August 13, 1958. 
36Ralph J. Cordiner, Chairman of the Board, General 
Electric Corporation, 11/umual Address to Stockholders," 
(April 23, 1958), p. 25. 
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"We told our employees," said one executive, "that if 
they build extra values like services, shipment on time, 
quality, savings, waste reduction, efficiency or anything 
representing a value to the customer, they would in turn 
make their jobs and income more secure."37 
One way the company tried to find out what extra 
values might be recognized by the consumer was to invite 
customers who toured General Electric plants to express 
their opinions on what they did and did not lilte about the 
company's products.38 
In one of its initial statements on the program, 
General Electric said that the key to success in the program 
would depend on the ability to marshall all resources of the 
company and bring them to bear upon the task of providing 
extra values for customers, and then building customer con-
fidence in 11 buying now". 
Every General Electric function (marketing, engineer-
ing, !ilanufacturing, finance and public and employee relations) 
was asked to contribute in providing and dramatizing extra 
values for the customer. 
Each department was represented by a man who served on 
the "Operation Upturn" Advisory Counci 1. The Advisory 
Council's function was to formulate basic ideas and suggestions 
37L. W. O'Brien,. loc. cit. 
that could be passed on to the respective departments for 
implementation. These meetings and other unified efforts 
that were needed for "Operation Upturn" yielded highly 
favorable results in one company spokesman's estimation. 
In the past managers were well aware of the 
importance of customer attitudes, but the 
employees were not too conscious of it. This 
program has enabled them to see that the cus-
tomer really is king. Also, the program has 
helped reduce rivalries that sometimes exist 
between departments. When you face a common 
enemy like slumping sales, all functions work 
together in greater unison.39 
~-6 
The central Public and &nployee Relations department 
of General Electric, which is located in New York City, 
helped in developing many of the basic ideas and materials 
for the program. One executive from that department, inter-
viewed after "Operation Upturn" had been running for about 
four months, said that "although the program is very exten-
sive, the planning was relatively simple. The symbol (an 
arrow turning upward) of the campaign, for example, was 
devised in a regular meeting of this department", he added, 
"and the worl{ was done by our staff. ttL~O 
This executive described "Operation Upturn" as just 
another program"--and not a crasi1 program. 110ur budget was 
not increased,'' he said, 11 and the program was done in an 
orderly and effective manner."41 
He also added that the central office put out the why's 
of the program and tl1e general principles; the bulk of the 
i+7 
materials produced carne from the action of independent pub-
lic relations departments of company branches throughout the 
country.42 
The announcement of General Electric's plans for 
"Operation Upturn" was made by the company president in an 
annual address to share ownecs at Schenectady, N. Y., on 
Apri 1 2]. In this announcement, the president said that the 
non-centralized approach of General Electric would apply in 
the program. 
Instead of depending on ideas, directions and 
decisions fro;n centralized headquarters, "Oper-
ation Upturn" will have more than one hundred 
decentralized points of initiative and decisions, 
each group applying its efforts to the specifics 
of its own market and organization.4J 
The central public relations department still had cer-
tain functions to perform. The department prepared a plan 
book for "Operation Upturn", which was first distributed at 
the stocl,holders 1 meeting. The plan book included such 
things as the basic plan, themes for action, objectives, 
organizational schemes, guide lines, ideas from past General 
Electric campaigns around the country, an address by the Gen-
era! Electric Chairman of the Board and promotional materials 
that were available from the company.i'4 
The spokesman from the central public relations depart-
ment said that the guide lines were a particularly important 
L+2Ibid. 4Jcordiner, loc. cit. 
44General Electric, Operation Upturn Plan Book, loc. 
cit. 
aspect of the kit. Through these, he said, the company 
emphasized that "Operation Upturn" was not a fight-the-
recession campaign and that the company did not want a 
patriotic theme. The guide lines also described the cam-
paign as 11worl{-smarter 11 program--not a speed-up program)l5 
The public relations department also prepared what 
the executive interviewed described as an 11 idea 11 manual. It 
contained the numerous ideas which came from all the various 
departments during the program. The major purpose of the 
manu a 1, according to the spol{esman, was to 9 i ve the cor.1pany 
officials some notion of the results when the proGram 
reached the half-way mark.46 
In slliTS<1ing up the public relations goals of the cen-
tral public relations function for "Operation Upturn", he 
said: 
Our function is to research, teach and appraise 
efforts. We are supposed to have the time to 
thini{ ahead and offer suggestions to our various 
divisions throughout the country. They, or
7
course, 
are not obliged to act on our suggestions.4 
When asi{ed how effective he thought the program had 
been, the executive replied: 
This is the same question r.tany have been ask-
ing us. We are very conservative in making any 
claims about effectiveness. However, we feel that 
it .•• is by far the most successful campaign that 
General Electric has ever stagect.48 
45o' Brien, 1 oc. cit. 47rbid. 48Ibid. 
He also noted that things of a permanent nature had 
been learned, and could be incorporated in the basic aims 
and purposes of the company. The greatest result, he con-
cluded, was improved understanding on the part of the 
employees.4'7 
III. OPERATION CAPACITY 
In June, Printer's Ink carried a story on a company 
which had responded to the recession challenge with a worlt-
ing program. The lead paragraph of the story said: 
Washington has told business repeatedly that 
it is businesses' responsibility to provide the 
basic force for economic growth during the 
recession. One company that has translated 
this advice into a wor>dng program is the Hudson 
Paper ,Pulp Corp., with headquarters in New York 
City.50 
The Hudson Corporation, which manufactures towels, 
hankies, facial tissues, gummed tape and other products for 
home and industry, developed a recession progrrun called 
"Operation Capac! ty" (0. C.) ,.51 
49 
The purpose of the program, according to the article, 
was to "inspire enthusiasm and boost the morale of its four 
thousand employees in five plant communities." Four specific 
objectives were listed: 1) increase sales volume, 2) lower 
1
'9I· · d '-t- D 1 • 
.50 11 Hudson Pulp Paper Shows the '.'lay to Beat Recession 
Thinking," Printer's ~' (June 27, 1958), pp. 56-.57 • 
.51 Ibid. 
costs, 3) keep plants on full schedule and 4l furnish the 
base for further expansion.52 
5o 
Fourteen specific projects were selected for "Oper-
ation Capacity, 11 which ranged from strengthening the company 
orsanizational structure to mustering employee support for 
Hudson consumer products. With the progr~~ as an impetus, 
the company also sought to expand its sales force, improve 
company-employee communications, increase supervisory 
trainins, increase sales aid programs for distributors, 
reduce unnecessary paper work, improve quality, mal{e a good 
employee suggestion system, reduce inventory and develop 
standards of individual and general performance.53 
The progr~n was introduced by Hudson plant managers, 
who arranged meetings with employees to discuss and explain 
the "Operation Capacity" plan. A slide presentation, 
featuring 110ssie 11 or 110. C. 11--the typical Hudson worker and 
symbol of the campaign--was made and talks were given on 
departmental projects.54 
Each worker was told that Hudson was operating at nor-
mal capacity, as compared to a four-fifths level of pro-
duction in the remainder of the industry. They were reminded 
that if Hudson production fell to the industry level each 
employee would lose $52.50 per month in wages. The workers 
were also told that two-thirds of every sales dollar went into 
53rbid. 54rbid. 
Sl 
manufacturing and if a five percent reduction of costs could 
be achieved, it could mean an addition of fifty salesmen, 
who could further enhance company sales and insure continued 
high rates of production.55 
The company also tried to reach other publics with 
110pera tion Capacity. 11 Schoo 1 principals were in vi ted to tour 
company plants. During the tours, company representatives 
announced plans for an essay contest for students. Three 
twenty-five dollar Savings Bonds were to be awarded for the 
best essays on the 11Value of Paper in OUr Daily Life. 11 The 
Company also told the principals that a color film on the 
paper-making process would be made available to schools.56 
Brochures and other literature were mailed to 
employees' families, telling the meaning and goal of 0. C. 
and announcing employee-of-the-month and employee-of-the-
year contests. 
Hudson also tried to stimulate local business in plant 
communities. It sponsored local merchant sales promotions, 
featuring 0. C. sales days. The purpose of these days, said 
the article, was to help defeat recession psychology and spur 
aggressive selling to keep local business operating at full 
capacity. 58 
The company also devised a visual symbol for letter-
heads, bulletins, press releases and plant signs. The symbol 
55 Ibid. 57rbid. 
consisted of the company's sailing ship trademark loaded to 
the gunwales with products--heading up a sales chart.59 
The program cost roughly about ~dO,OOO and after its 
inception, volume increased and inventories decreased. In 
addition, "Operation Capacity" received heavy play from 
local newspapers, both in news and editorial columns.60 
IV. PHOvUCT PRO!v'IJTION AND "HARD 'SELL 11 EFFORTS 
Many businessmen were convinced that the most 
effective way to beat recession problems was to tempt cus-
tomers with new and better products. 
52 
New :)roducts. One company which had outstanding sue-
-,__ 
cess in this area was camera maker, Bell & Howell. Bell & 
Howell not only introduced nine additional items to its line 
of equipment during the recession, but also offered sub-
stantial price reductions. Four 8-rrun "electric eye" cameras 
were priced from ~~99.95 to $159.95 in 1958. In the previous 
year, the company had only two of these, tagged at .$11-t9.95 
and :~ 16 9 • 9 5. 61 
Bell & Howell was able to lower prices by stepping up 
production to force lower unit costs. To focus conswner 
attention on these new lines and prices, the company quad-
rupled its advertising budget in 1958ts second quarter.62 
59rb·" lu. 60Ibid. 
61 11 It's That Extra Enterprise," Newsweek, (;'!arch 31, 
1958), pp. 79-83. 
62Ibid. 
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The recession actually helped Bell & Howell set up its 
big drive, said one source. The company was able to pick up 
television time at a twenty-five percent discount and sup-
pliers were ready and willing to slice their prices to get 
the big component and raw-materials orders.63 
The Philip Lesly Company, which handles public 
relations for Bell & Howell, contributed mostly publicity 
and promotional assistance. Press releases and photographs 
of each of the company's new product lines were given wide 
dissemination and numerous promotional booklets were pre-
pared and distributed to dealers.64 
W. A. Sheaffer Pen Company also responded to the 
recession with a new product line. It introduced a fancy 
line of "Lady Sheaffer'' gold, silver, periwinkle, and carmine-
colored pens--adorned with silver, rhinestones and other 
touches. The company nearly doubled output by sellin~ 
through new distribution outlets--cosmetic counters, bouti-
ques, and jewelry departments.65 
"Hard Sell." For those cor;~panies lacking new products, 
-·--
their promoting and selling problems were more difficult dur-
ing the recession; it was a time for more concentrated selling 
efforts, as the Wall Street Journal reported: 
63Ibid. 
64Personal Co®nunique from Philip Lesly Co., Chicago, 
Ill., July 29, 1958. 
65"It•s That Extra Enterprise," !?.E.· ci_~. 
In the jargon of Madison Ave. ad aaencies 
advertisers are shifting from the 11 soft sell{' 
to the "hard sell," putting more emphasis on 
products and prices and less on tnstitutional 
or "company image 11 advertising.6 
The return of the so-called 11 hard sell" inspired, to 
some degree, a rebirth of gimmid{S and giveaways. Hotpoint, 
Electrical Co., for example, sent several dealers and their 
wives, garbed in full pirate regalia, to a Pacific island 
to dig for buried chests containing $7,500. Another elec-
trical company sent dealers and mates to a Spanish castle 
for a week-long stay.67 
But beyond all these promotional schemes were some 
strong selling efforts--and bargains. As one publication 
commented: 
" •.• the hard sell's clincher was bargains. 
And bargains were showing up again ••• If this 
was not a cure-all, the hard sell boys made 
clear that there was no better single tonic 
for economy than relentless advertising and 
muscular merchandi~ing of attractive goods at 
attractive prices. o 
One example of a recession "hard sell" effort is a 
program which was conducted by the Davega Stores Corporation. 
It was advertised as a 11By-Your-Way-To-Prosper i ty 11 program 
and conducted in cooperation with such companies as RCA, Bell 
66wall Street Journal, January 29, 19;)8, p. 1. 
67wall Street Journal, January 24, 1958, p. 1. 
----
68"The Hard Sell vs. Hard Times, II ~. {Apr i 1 14, 
19 58)' p. 24-25. 
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& Howell, Er.lerson Radio, Wilson Sporting Goods, Frigidaire, 
Zenith, knplex and General Electric.69 
Special sales were offered and consur.1ers were able to 
buy without down payment through a liberalized financing 
plan in conjunction with General Electric's Credit Corpor-
ation.70 
V. CGMMUN I TY CAivlP AI GNS 
11~ Auto Buy Now". One of the most widely discussed 
and publicized anti-recession campaigns, "You Auto Buy Now 11 , 
began at the co~uunity level. Lagging auto sales were a big 
factor in the recession, and Detroit was hit for failure to 
produce cars at reasonable prices. Automobile spol,esmen, on 
the other hand, often blamed their poor sales on dwindling 
public confidence. And a Cleveland (Ohio) auto dealer came 
up with a plan to build confidence and sell automobiles.71 
The program was supported by the Cleveland Auto Deal-
ers Association and the Chamber of Comi-rterce, which launched 
the effort under the slogan, 11Keep Cleveland Business Healthy 
--You Auto Buy Now. 11 Cleveland auto dealers spent some 
$2$0,000 on promotion, car makers poured in additional money 
69 11can Advertising Help Reverse Recession? Some 
Advertisers Are Willino to Try, 11 Printer's Ink, (April 11, 
1958)' pp. 9-10. -
70Ibid. 
71 11Push Car Sales," Business~' (March 8, 1958), 
p. 48. 
and local papers featured the drive editorially. Radio and 
television donated $50,000 of spot ti2e.72 
56 
The Cleveland campaign, which was held during the last 
week of February, 1958, was deemed a success. Some 3,300 new 
cars were sold at a retail value of $10 million and 3,500 
used cars, valued at $5 million, were sold. In the first 
three weeks of February, Cleveland auto dealers had sold only 
2,565 new cars.73 
Seven days after the Cleveland campaign ended, the car 
manufacturers in Detroit set up a joint committee to stage 
similar promotions in other cities, agreeing to send a top 
executive from the companies to arouse dealers in each city, 
and to provide organizational support. The idea caught on 
and 11 You Auto Buy Now 11 campaigns were conducted in about three 
hundred cities. In each campaign, major emphasis was placed 
on the sale of automobiles as the cornerstone of the a:::onomy. 74 
In a 11Report on What Really Happened in the 1 You Auto 
Buy Now' Campaign 11 , the Bureau of Advertising of the American 
Newspaper Publishers Association found that ninety-three per-
cent of two hundred-fourteen Chamber of Commerce groups sur-
veyed termed the program "successful. 11 Only six percent 
73Ibid. 
--
74carl Spielvogel, New York Times, September 10, 1958, 
p. 45. 
reported "failure". The bureau also reported that the pro-
gram had "a considerable effect on the economy as a whole 
and on pub lie morale, 11 75 
The bureau concluded: 
The event proved conclusively that old-
fashioned selling backed by strong advertising 
and other promotion, was the dire need of the 
slipping economy. It emphasized once again 
a truism of business that has been largely for-
gotten during a long period of easy prosperity 
--that the customer does not buy; he must be 
sold.76 
"Buy~"· The "You Auto Buy Now" campaign in Cleve-
aldn was followed by another similar promotion effort. It 
was called "Buy Now" and was bac!{ed by some two hundred 
community leaders, in an effort to promote retail sales. 77 
A double 1'V 11 sign was adopted--Values for Victory, to 
signify victory over recession, Downtown Cleveland retailers 
stayed open every night during the first week of the campaign 
and there were city-wide decorations. In addition, restau-
rants offered specials for shoppers, the Chamber of Commerce 
encouraged suppliers to bring products into the city for 
special promotion and the news media gave heavy support, as 
in the auto campaign.78 
77 11Cleveland Plans Drive to Rout the Recession," 
Printer's ~' (April 18, 1958), p. 15. 
78rbrd. 
Other cities carried on similar efforts and some 
communi ties tried to build confidence through dramatic 
stunts. For example, an April, 1958, issue of Life had a 
two-page picture spread on a group of businessmen in 
Kankakee, Illinois, attired in funeral black, who 11 rode on 
58 
a rai 1 and laid to rest 'Mr. Gloom', symbol of the recession." 
The local entrepreneurs had dressed an effigy, taken it on 
a railroad hand-car to a site outside town and buried it 
with due pomp and circumstance. Said Life: 11The Kani<akee 
carryings-on were aimed directly--and quite properly--at 
penny-pinching pessimism. 11 79 
79 11The Hard Sell vs. Hard Times, 11 loc. cit. 
CHAPTER IV 
Nt.wS COVERAGE AND PUilLI C RELATIONS 
PUBLICITY POLICY 
As we have mentioned repeatedly, the 1957-58 reces-
sion was one of the most publicized business declines in 
this country's history. When a recession is so widely pub-
licized, it places a heavy burden of responsibility on news-
men and publicists. If either fails to report the story 
fully and accurately, distortions may result which can have 
serious effects on public confidence. In this chapter we 
shall cite some shortcomings in the publicity area during 
the 1957-58 recession, set down some personal observations 
on problems confronting the newsmen and publicists during a 
recession, and offer some public relations policy ideas on 
handling recession news. 
I. THE MASS MEDIA 
The mass media is a major source of economic intelli-
gence. Through the mediums of television, radio, newspapers 
and magazines, people gain a number of definite impressions 
about the country's economy. To what degree these impressions 
influence individual economic decisions is anybody 1 s guess, 
but the potential to influence does exist. 
What are some of the problems confronting the mass media 
during a recession and how might they influence reporting? 
60 
One problem relates to advertising. The mediums of mass 
co~nunications are, of course, dependent on advertising for 
their existence. Through fear of possible advertising cur-
tailments during a business recession, some media managers 
may order reporters to 11 go easy" on the recession story. 
Time reported two instances where southern newspapers 
witheld unfavorable news during the recession. The Atlanta 
(Ga.) Journal, said~. suppressed the news of a layoff 
of two thousand Lockheed Aircraft worl{ers in the fall until 
it could report the factory had found other jobs for them. 
And in Memphis (Tenn.) a Scripp's Howard paper ran a glow-
ing story on expansion plans for a local Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. plant without mentioning that 2,600 of its 3,600 
employees had been laid off. Remarked Time: "Many newspapers 
were afraid to scare their advertisers."l 
In addition to the possibility of advertising 11 bias 11 
during a recession, there is some evidence to support the 
idea that newsmen favor 11 rosy 11 headlines, even when times are 
bad. 
A study was conducted during the war at an interval 
when defeats and discouragements were intermingled with suc-
cesses. The authors classified the heads and subheads of 
lnsilver Lining the Slump, 11 Time, (March 17, 1958), 
p. 53. 
twelve representative newspapers from August 17 to November 
17, 1942, and found that there was a preponderence of opti-
mistic headlines.2 
The authors note that while the invasion of North 
Africa occurred during this period, there were "plenty of 
grim communiques from the Solomons, from the Stalingrad 
front, and from the submarine zone. 11 3 
Few editors, we feel, would defend their 
cheery headlines on the grounds of the pre-
ponderence of happy events during the period 
under discussion.4 
Some editors, they said, might argue that optimistic 
headlines make people feel gayer, raise morale--but the 
61 
authors question the validity of this idea, too, citing this 
piece from Time: 
Since the North African victory, some blood 
donors are failing to keep appointments at Red 
Cross donor centers. The Red Cross has noticed 
c" 
such defaults always increase after good news./ 
Whether or not these findings can be applied to head-
line writing during contemporary business recessions is 
questionable. However, they do offer some basis for 
speculation. 
If newsmen did write predominantly optimistic head-
lines during the 1957-58 recession, they may have unwittingly 
2Elizabeth C. Winslop and Gordon W. Allport, 11Do Rosy 
Headlines Sell Newspapers," Public Opinion and Propaganda, 
(New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 271-74. 
3Ibict. ' '+Ibid. 5 Ibid. 
fed feelings of pessimism. People, said Katona, senerally 
derive their "economic" views from their own personal 
situation. 
A current of information, which overrides per-
sonal experiences, is probably a rare occurence 
and requires confirmation and reinforcement over 
an extended period. At most other times, news 
and information are evaluated in terms of oer-
sonal experiences. This is particularly true of 
news about incipient recessions. When newspapers, 
radio and television report on growing unemploy-
ment and falling production and make dire pre-
dictions, people whose personal situations have 
been adversely affected are influenced for a 
short while only, rather than permanently. 
Knowledge of unfavorable economic events may 
even result in seeing one's own situation in a 
more favorable light and may later become the 
basis for renewed confidence and optimism. This 
does not, of course, mean that a much advertised 
recession cannot become severe. It does mean, 
however, that suppressing or sugar-coating bad 
news for fear that it may create mass hysteria 
--as was advocated in 6958--is not necessary and 
may even be dangerous. 
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There was considerable feeling that newsmen failed to 
mention enough good things about the economy during the 
recession and that they gave too much emphasis to unfavorable 
developments. This was, in fact, one of the major con-
tentions of those who supported the Advertising Counci 1 
pr o~ram. 
In terms of space alloted, the media did devote con-
siderable attention to the recession, perhaps more than the 
6George J{atona, The Powerful Consumer, (New Yorl<:: 
McGraw Hill, 1960), pp.-y3" .. 39. 
' -, 0_:, 
story merited. This could have been good or bad, depending 
on one's own personal interpretation, It would seei::t, :1ow-
ever, that heavy news coverage of a recession would be 
valuable if it enabled people to make a more precise esti-
mate of the economic situation. If people more clearly 
understand a situation, the possibility of their making 
incorrect decisions is generally lessened. On the other 
hand, if people are given only a partial view--an incomplete 
estimate of economic conditions--they may act unwisely. 
Of course, it is not always possible to equate the 
"quanti ty 11 of information received with understanding. Much 
of the recession news may have been simply a facts and fig-
ures round-up with little or no attendant explanation. Sur-
veys have revealed that people want to know what is happening. 
News must carry information and explanation 
for developments that take place since people 
genuinely want to know what takes place, and 
1 ii{e ly won't be inf 1 uenced otherwise. 7 
II. GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY 
Earlier we said that the gover~ment adopted a confi-
dent recession ''line.'' This policy backfired to some extent 
when the recession got progressively worse and some of the 
President's predictions for an early upturn were proved false. 
7Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
During a recession, the government has several special 
responsibilities. It must Interpret the wealth of economic 
data It has available and then give the best possible 
appraisal of economic conditions; it must, within the 
boundaries of available facts, bolster public confidence; 
and it must use Its anti-recession financial "guns" when 
circumstances dictate. Considering the complexity of the 
economy, there is ample room for policy errors or mis-
judgements when a business downturn occurs. The problem is, 
however, that such errors can crad' public confidence since 
they are so quickly noticed and publicized. Observant 
reporters and the political opposition warily watch an 
incumbent administration, particularly during a business 
recession. Here is one reporter's corrunents on the Presi-
dent's statements: 
The White House is practically alone in its 
prediction of a strong recovery. President 
Eisenhower's report on the state of the economy 
on February 12 was freely interpreted as an 
attempt to bolster the waning confidence of 
both businessmen and consumers. But stock 
prices dropped when the statement was issued, 
and many businessmen, made skeptical by 
Eisenhower's ear 1 i er view that the economy 
was simply taking a "breather,'' felt that his 
confidence that this month would "mark the 
beginning of the end of the downturn" was . 
policy uncomfortably reminscent of Hooverian.B 
8rv1. J. Rossant, "Washington and the Recession: V{i 11 
it be too Little too Late," The Reporter, (March 6, 19~8), 
pp. 11-16. -
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Once the publicity tone for the government was set by 
President Eisenhower, other governmental departments fol-
lowed suit. 
The Secretary (Weeks of Corrunerce) is the 1 ate s t 
official to sound the new Administration line--
that business is expected to pick up by mid-year 
and that 1958 as a whole will be as good as, or 
better than, 1957.9 
When public statements by the governmental leaders, 
business executives or any opinions leaders smack of delib-
erate, unsupported confidence-building attempts, people 
sooner or later grow skeptical. Publicity must have sub-
stance in fact and attempts to gloss over real economic 
problems with well-turned phrases can have serious effects. 
Late in February, 1958, publications began to reveal 
inconsistencies between statements and policy by the govern-
ment. A Wall Street Journal lead story was headed: "Chances 
Grow for Big Tax Cut as Pessimism Deepens in Washington. 11 
The articles said essentially that the recession was worse 
than officials publicly admitted, that it had become a 
political issue, and that there were deep-seated fears of 
deflationary trends.lO 
Government statements in March (1958) had a ring of 
urgency. Early in the month, Vice President Nixon said that 
9wall ~~ Journal, January 2, 1958, p. 3. 
lOwall Street Journal, February 13, 1953, p. 1. 
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he favored a tax reduction as the next major step to deal 
with the recession.ll His comments were followed by Secre-
tary of Labor rMtchell 1 s remarks to an AFL-CIO conference: 
••• a major and substantial cut in personal 
and business taxes is being fully considered 
and its details worked out. It is ready for 
the immediate use as an additional stimulus 
to the economy and it will used if necessary.12 
After following a "hands off" policy through most of 
the recession--and justifying its position with frequent 
statements on the basic strength of the economy--the govern-
ment suddenly began issuing remarks on a possible tax cut--
an anti-recession measure of major proportion. 
The quick reversal in policy and publicity could have 
done serious damage to public confidence were it not for the 
general awareness of the public. 
There was, as we said earlier, firm foundation for 
confidence. Both consumers and businessmen were in general 
agreement with the goverrunent 1 s views that the recession 
would not develop into a deep depression. However, neither 
group seemed as confident as the government of an early 
upturn in business. 
The goverru~ent was, in a sense, trying to use publicity 
as an anti-recession weapon and it is difficult to make any 
llHans H. Landsberg "We Cannot Afford This Recession," 
The Reporter, (May 15, 195S), pp. 10-16. 
12Ibid. 
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judgement about its success or failure. Economic conditions 
did begin improving in 1958's final quarter and this may 
have been due in part to the generally optimistic news that 
the government helped create. But one is inclined to feel 
that the good-news-for-good-news-sake idea was overdone by 
government spokesr.1en. 
The goverThnent must, of course, promote the economy, 
particularly at times of recession. But how can it best do 
this? Certainly by not filling the press with confident 
predictions while ignoring the problems created by the 
decline. The basic issues, it seems, should be discussed 
freely and openly, and possible goverllinent anti-recession 
measures should be listed from the outset. The assurance 
people want and expect from the goverruuent is that it 
recognizes the problems and has at least mapped federal plans 
for meeting them. 
III. BUSINESS PUBLICITY 
For business organizations, publicity is often unfav-
orable during economic recessions. News of layoffs, pro-
duction cutbacks and other adverse developments are dutifully 
noted in the press. 
Of course, when a company's sales increase despite a 
recession, it may be showered with laudatory corrunents by the 
press. American Motors Corporation's sales, for example, 
countered the downward trend in 1958 by zooming twenty-six 
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percent above the previous year's and many publications 
noted this success in contrast to generally dismal sales in 
the remainder of the automobile industry.lJ 
Generally speaking, however, a recession is a 11 bad 
news" situation for industry. The problem which may arise 
as a result of this situation is that many companies may be 
reluctant to have its recession setbacl{s lmown publicly; 
they may try to conceal or withhold unfavorable information 
of public interest. Or they may attempt to 11 bury 11 bad news 
in a sea of meaningless press releases which spealt of the 
"good" things that may happen to the company. 
If a company's motives are discovered--and they 
usually are in these cases--the bad news can be compounded. 
People may make unfounded speculations simply because they 
lack reliable infonnation. 
In most large business organizations today, public 
relations departments or counseling organizations arc 
responsible for the preparation and distribution of publicity. 
And in many corporations, publicity policy is often guided 
by public relations department heads or public relations 
counsel. One public relations executive feels that many pub-
lic relations practitioners are failing to fulfill their 
responsibilities in this area. 
13wall Street Journal, February 10, 1958, p. l. 
Probably the most important shortcoming of 
public relations practitioners today is a 
tendency to limit their efforts to publicizing 
the 11nice 11 things about their companies while 
sweeping under the rug the crucial issues •.• l4 
Although public opinion and publicity experts supply 
mounting evidence that one of the most effective ways to 
spike ruraor, innuendo and confusion is to make all available 
facts on a problem situation known immediately, many cling 
to the idea that people should know as little as possible 
about such matters. 
Sometimes, management wi 11 block honest efforts by 
public relations men by witholding information or forbidding 
the distribution of certain information of public nature. 
Obstinate executives cannot always be convinced, but through 
fear of position or reprimand, some public relations men may 
be less than zealous in their efforts to alter management 
attitudes on these matters. 
Cornpe ti ti ve pressures and pub 1 ici ty assaults from 
other interest groups may also affect company publicity 
policies during a recession. Businessmen may feel compelled 
to wi thold certain information for fear competitors and 
groups such as unions and government agencies might turn it 
to their advantage. 
A Fortune article illustrates another dilemma that may 
develop during a business recession. The article said that a 
14J. Stanford Smith, "Challenge for Business Statesmen,'' 
Public Relations Journal, {February 1958), p. 14. 
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few businessmen were ''talking for effect,'' and ''taking it 
upon themselves to protect the public from what they really 
thought, under the impression that they were helping to pro-
mote prosperity.rrl;) Two examples are given: 
One prominent Chicago banker carried the best-
foot-forward policy to unusual lengths. In Feb-
ruary he had taken an informal poll of the mood 
of thirty top business executives and found them 
more optimistic than they had been two months 
earlier. Accordingly, he picked up the telephone 
and told a member of the Cabinet in Washington 
that sentiment in the Midwest had ir,lproved. 
Fortune asked the banker if he personally thought 
1Jie business prospects were actually better. 
11 No, not personally," he blandly replied. Another 
banking executive, who writes a monthly business 
review distributed throughout Texas and who has 
been bu 11 ish in print, said in private: "Of course 
I give the facts in my newsletter but I can't 
tell everything I know. I have quite a following 
in Texas and I have to be careful what I say. 11 16 
Conclusion. Publicists and public relations men, 
representing business, union organizations and goverTh1lent 
agencies, are a major news source for reporters and can exert 
so;ne control over information. Sometimes, however, public 
relations men have erroneous notions as to how their control 
should be exercised in releasing news on adverse economic 
developments. There is probably a minority of publicists 
who believe that by suppressing or witholding bad news at a 
time of business decline, they can help the psychological 
climate. While this may worl< in rare instances, it see;ns to 
15Georae B. Bookman, "How Top Businessmen View the 
Recession, 11 Fortune, (Apri 1 1958), p. 112. 
16Ibid, 
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be a rather bad policy. Newsmen have other information sources 
and they will not hold a very high opinion of a publicist 
who attempts to conceal a legitimate news item simply because 
it casts his organization in a bad light, or because it might 
"scare" people. 
If, during a recession, reporters come looking for bad 
news--and an organization has some to report--it should be 
reported fully and accurately by the public relations repre-
sentative; it is his job to answer honestly and completely 
any reasonable request by a mass media representative. 
However, dispatching bad news is only one phase of 
recession publicity. For the imaginative public relations 
man, a recession can offer unique publicity opportunities. 
After the initial barrage of stories on how the recession has 
affected various sectors of the economy, reporters begin 
looking for new ''angles''· In our review of the newspapers and 
magazines published during the 1957-58 recession we noted that 
in the beginning most of these publications devoted consid-
erable space to stories on the tinfavorable economic develop-
ments. Once this phase of the recession story was reported, 
they began carrying stories on anti-recession actions by 
business and government. It is at this point that public 
relations and publicity men can help to change the complexion 
of the news, and perhaps garner some favorable publicity for 
the organizations they represent. 
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Industrial publicists can contribute by getting out 
every piece of positive news on the business organizations 
they represent. Stories on new product innovations, 
expansion and development plans, worker callbacks, clever 
cost-cutting measures, unusual promotion schemes, special 
employee efforts and many other company responses to the 
recession challenge may be well received. 
A recession might also be an especially good time 
to open company doors to media representatives who want to 
find their own stories. The element of control is mostly 
limited in such cases and the story might not be one 
hundred per cent in the company's favor, but it might 
cement press relations for years to come. 
CHAPTER V 
CAN ATTITUDES BE INFLUENCED'! 
We have said that attitudes are important and have 
discussed some attempts to favorably influence attitudes 
during the 1957-58 recession. In this concluding chapter 
we will first consider the role of information in affecting 
attitude changes. Then, we will evaluate the programs dis-
cussed in Chapter Three in terms of their possible impact 
on attitudes, and offer some opinions on their relative 
merits. In a concluding statement, we will discuss the 
responsibilities of public relations practitioners during a 
business recession. 
I • THE ROLE OF IN FORMAT ION 
While there has been a substantial increase in the 
number of people who can make economic decisions that matter, 
business and conswner discretion could hardly be exercised to 
influence the economy if broad masses of people were entirely 
uninformed about economic events. Economic awareness is 
probably higher today than ever before. Through the media 
of mass communications, news-,.both good and bad--is spread 
rapidly, and because of the centralized nature of news 
sources, fairly uniformly. Every localized economic ailment 
can be known nationally in a matter of hours, even minutes!! 
!George Katona, The Powerful Consumer, (New York: 
McGraw Hi 11) , p. 13. 
However, the mass media are not the only sources of 
economic information, and, according to one source, probably 
not the most important. Information received on a more 
personal level may have greater impact on decisions than the 
news which is transmitted by the mass media.2 
Friends, fellow workers, merchants and other personal 
associates are believed to be a major source of economic 
intelligence for consumers. So, too, are unions, fraternal 
groups and other organizations to which the consumer may 
belong. Information received by word of mouth, says one 
writer, can influence conslli~er decisions. People are more 
attuned to the information they receive at these informal 
levels, mainly because it applies more specifically to their 
own personal views and opinions. Another reason why this 
information may influence individual economic behavior is the 
tendency of people to accept information that conforms to 
group norms,3 
One important aspect of our behavioral enviorn-
ment is group belonging ••• What news and information 
reaches us is at least colored by our group 
belonging; so is our interpretation of the news; 
and the principle of social vacillation says that 
action similar to the action of other members of 
our group ~ s easy, whi 1 e contrary action is 
difficul t.4 
Businessmen, who have access to information which comes 
through both standard channels and highly specialized sources, 
2Ibid,, p. 147. 3Ibid, 4 -' ~·' p. 55. 
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would seem less prone to group conformity, observes Katona, 
because of their solid knowledge. However, he believes 
that the reverse is probably true. Businessmen, he says, 
unite in cohesive groups, while consumers do not. 
"Businessmen are more subject to group conformity," he 
concludes.5 
It is possible for information about events outside 
the business sphere to affect consumer and/or business 
decisions. Information about goverrunent spending is one 
example. AlthouGh the government spends far less than the 
private sectors--and its spending is rigidly controlled by 
budgetary requirements--slight changes in government spending 
can have considerable impact on business decisions--and 
ultimately on consumer decisions. 
News of Federal Reserve Board actions (announcement of 
changes in the interest rate, for example) may also influence 
decisions. So, too, can international developments like 
increased world tension ••. or domestic problems like inclement 
weather in farm belts, labor strikes and political conflicts. 
The list of news events that may sway economic decisions ~y 
businessmen and consumers is virtually inexhaustible. 
Bad news in itself does not cause recessions. J{ews is 
only an account of an event that has transpired. However, 
5Ibid., pp. 233-34. 
our argwnent is that news or information can cause an exag-
gerated response if conditions are right. In other words, 
if people (consumers and businessmen) in one area of the 
country learn that business is not good in another locale, 
they may, if for some reason they are worried or concerned 
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somewhat about their own economic security, respond to the 
news by curtailing their expenditures by more than their own 
situation warrants. 
Is it possible for good news to have a similar effect7 
Will people, once a recession has developed, respond to good 
news in a somewhat exaggerated fashion7 Economic behavior, 
it is said, is most commonly influenced by new information. 
People are constantly looldng for new stimulation. When 
business is bad, they look for good sions. Conversely, they 
are inclined to be more sensitive to unfavorable economic 
news during good times. 
If this assumption is valid, business, government and 
other groups are appealing to a generally receptive audience 
when they propose anti-recession measures duting a business 
decline. It is not implied, however, that unsophisticated 
appeals will be well received. 
Contrary to sorae popular notions, surveys have shown 
that American consumers have generally sound economic views. 
We are told nowadays that conswners are puppets 
in the hands of unscrupulous or hidden persuaders 
and manipulators. It is true that consumer think-
ing is not fully logical, and frequent repetition 
influences conslli~er choices, especially when 
the choice does not matter much. But, on the 
whole, the broad middle-income groups have been 
found to have a concise and meagingful picture 
of the workings of the economy. 
7 '7 
What type of information is most likely to stimulate 
this group of sophisticated consumers, which, through its 
discretionary spending role, can influence economic trends? 
What statement and "deeds" can trigger favorable attitudes 
during a business decline? What can industry do to encourage 
consumers to spend more during a business decline? And what 
can oovernment do, not only to encourage consumer spending 
but also to urge greater business investments? 
I I • INFOfUviA.T ION PROGH.AJ'vlS 
The Advertising Council endeavored to stimulate econ-
omic behavior by offering new information. Its program was 
designed for general appeal, although many business organi-
zations were able to tailor the general ''confidence'' theme 
to their specific promotional needs. 
The Counci 1 was interested mainly in promoting confi-
dence in the basic economic health of the nation. What it 
did essentially was to round-up sowe facts on the country's 
growth potential, translate them into basic advertising 
appeals and give them wide dissemination. Their efforts were 
6George Katona, "The Psychology of the Recession,'' 
Speech Delivered at the Convention of the American Psycholog-
ical Association, September 1, 1958, pp. 17-lo. 
we 11 received by the mass media in terms of space and tirne 
allotted, and they also received some favorable editorial 
comment. 
Since it is difficult to trace any cause-and-effect 
relationships, one can only speculate as to how effective 
an information program of this nature may be. 
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Source credibility. One important factor in deter-
mining the effectiveness of communications is the attitude 
of the audience toward the communicator. Can the individual 
or group relaying the information be trusted] 
The Advertising Council, while a non-profit organi-
zation, is still aligned with business interests and views. 
Leading executives from industry serve on the Council advis-
ory and planning committees; advertising and public relations 
rnen implement the programs and business organizations support 
the Council through voluntary contributions. 
Do these ties with business interests make Council 
inforraation programs less effective? Do people suspect the 
validity of the information which is promulgated through the 
contributions of businessmen who raay benefit financially if 
the information has the desired effects] 
It is doubtful that people in general question the 
veracity of Council statements for these reasons. Although 
the Council is supported by business contributions and busi-
nessmen do tat{e an active part in some of its programs, the 
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Council image as a public service organization prevails. 
The Council has established an excellent reputation through 
its many and varied programs--its efforts in forest fire 
prevention probably being most widely recognized. Every-
body 1 ike s 11Smolcey the Bear. 11 
Nature of information. The critical question in 
determining the type of information to be distributed during 
business recessions is whether or not the information should 
refer to the problems the economy is facing. There are two 
fairly distinct views. 
One view is that people are fully aware of these 
problems--that they need not be discussed further. Infor-
mation, say adherents to this view, should relate to positive 
elements in the economy; people need to be reminded of the 
economic development and growth which is going on all around 
them in spite of recession conditions. This, they say, is 
the way to restore confidence and get the economy going in 
the right direction. 
The other view is that proble.11s must be discussed if 
the information is to have any real influence. Proponents 
of this view say to ignore the problems is to practice a ldnd 
of deceit which can harm rather than help feelings of 
confidence. 
Of the two views, the Council program adhered more 
closely to the first. The information distributed by Council 
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bureaus cited only positive elements in the economy with no 
reference to specific problems. 
The Council argued that it was trying to reverse the 
bad news trend with some favorable economic facts. 
Undoubtedly, there was need for some positive news, if for 
no other reason than to give reporters a fresh slant on the 
recession story. Several papers discussed the Council cam-
pai£n in their editorial pages and the Council public 
relations arm pumped out news releases on favorable economic 
development at the rate of one per day. However, it is 
doubtful that this information turned the "bad news" tide, 
as the Council hoped it might. 
While the media may have given a disproportionate 
amount of space to the recession story, they were not creat-
ing "bad news." The economy was faltering and the press 
reported the story. Only an upturn in business could sig-
nificantly change the tone of the news. 
Limitations of~ advertising technique. Advertising 
techniques have seemed to prove effective in previous Council 
campaigns, (the Council figures on forest fire prevention are 
impressive), but one questions how effective they be in pro-
raoting economic strengths during business d<.clines. Can an 
economy be sold to the people in the same way as toothpaste 
and chewing gum? 
The Council advertising messages were flashed in news 
publications and on radio and television networ!{s from coast 
81 
to coast; subways and buses carried them on car cards. In 
terms of the advertising axioms of 11 exposure 11 and 11repetition11 
the Council effort was outstanding. Millions of Americans 
surely 11got the message." But aside from the public service 
tag, which distinguishes Council ads somewhat, the adver-
tisements were competing for attention, much like the 
millions of other advertisements. Perhaps the ads did serve 
to remind millions of Americans of the country's economic 
potentials. But it does not necessarily follow that this 
information would change their short-term economic decisions. 
Business confidence. The Council campaign received 
substantial support from businessmen. The Industries Advis-
ory Committee, which passes judgement on all Council cam-
paigns, consists of some sixty executives, representing nearly 
every major industry in the country. As the program gained 
momentwn, many other representatives of industry became 
involved. The campaign thus encouraged a number of business 
executives to think and to talk about the positive factors in 
the economy. Whether or not the exposure to the campaign had 
any effect on their economic decisions is another question. 
Businessmen may lend verbal support to a program like the one 
discussed, but their own economic decisions may be governed by 
an entirely different set of facts. Businessmen, like consum-
ers, are essentially conservative. They may have confidence 
in their economy's ultimate potentials but they usually act in 
S2 
accordance with existing data. Only a few venture large sums 
of capital when business conditions are bad. 
Business participation. In our earlier discussion, 
we cited instances of individual concerns employing the basic 
campaign ideas. This may have been the major contribution of 
the Council effort. Sinclair, for example, was able to trans-
late the ideas into a sound recession sales program. Other 
companies used the Council materials ins upplementary public 
relations efforts, revamping some for distribution to specific 
publics like dealers, stockholders and customers. We know 
that attitudes are more apt to be influenced if the appeal is 
in terms of individual interests. And these participating 
companies did, to some degree, mal\e the Council appeals more 
specific. 
Public relations approach. Public relations playeti 
only a minor role in the Council campaign. The major function 
of the public relations counseling organization involved was 
to prepare basic materials like press kits, press releases, 
speeches, fact sheets, and the lilte. The campaign was 
essentially an advertising effort and the public relations 
approach was used sparingly. 
Perhaps if greater emphasis had been given to public 
relations the program would have been more effective. But to 
support a strong public relations program that would reach 
specific publics and interest groups throughout the country 
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would be extremely costly and contrary to the philosophy of 
the Council organization. The Advertising Council seel{s to 
influence behavior through advertising, not public relations. 
Conclusions. Information programs to influence econ-
omic behavior on a mass scale have distinct possibilities. 
Post-war recessions have been spotty; some areas of the 
country have been hard-hit while others have continued to 
prosper. None of these recessions, with the possible 
exception of the 1957-58 decline, has threatened to develop 
into a deep depression. The problem has been, however, that 
when people have learned that the country is in a recession, 
they have often curtailed their spending even if their own 
situation has not been adversely affected. 
In his recent book, Katona commented that cons~~ers 
may not be receiving adequate information. 
Instead of arguing that there is too much man-
ipulation of conswners, a good case might be made 
for the thesis that they are not manipulated enough 
in the sense of not being helped to acquire 
sufficient information and knowledge. To attempt 
to influence conswners so that they should better 
understand their function and make better use of 
their power is a task for leaders of public 
opinion.? 
A recession might be an excellent time to conduct such 
educational efforts. for one reason, they may help to influ-
ence people's short-term economic behavior (i. e., encourage 
7George }\atona, The Powerful Conswaer, .£1?.·, cit., p. 2lf5• 
them to spend more) by dispelling certain doubts and uncer-
tainties. Also, public interest in the econor.w seens to run 
high during a recession, and the audience might be more 
receptive. People may be generally indifferent about the 
subject of economics, but their interest seems to perlt-up 
when the economy is not doing well. 
Economic information, of course, is dispersed at 1;mny 
levels, but we are primarily interested in large-scale 
attempts to inform and influence the wasses such as the 
Advertising Council program. 
The Advertising Council effort was an information pro-
gram only in a limited sense. Information was distributed by 
the Council but it was narrow in scope, since it did not deal 
directly with the problems of the recession and the ''facts" 
were limited to seven basic points on economic growth. 
If more comprehensive information programs are con-
ducted, what kind of information should be distributed? Who 
should sponsor these efforts? And how should the information 
be distributed? 
A recession is an ambiguous situation. Surveys have 
shown that most consumers understand the major reasons for the 
recession but few have insights into the complex inter-
relationships involved. Therefore, one of the first objectives 
of an information program should be to explain and interpret 
the recession. 
People receive a wide range of views and opinions on 
a recession from many sources, but they are seldom offered 
in an organized fashion from a single source. 
The basic problem in conducting such an information 
program is translating economic data into informative, 
stimulating and persuasive messages. There is a certain 
public apathy about economics which makes this a challenging 
tas!{. Many people find economics a dry, uninteresting sub-
ject. However, as we mentioned earlier, interest is stirau-
lated by a recession, and it is possible to make econo;nics 
a highly interesting subject for many. Harvard economist, 
John Gailbraith, has ably proved this point with his best 
seller, "The Affluent Society. 11 
A recession information program could be supported by 
a nuraber of groups. Large business organizations, the govern-
ment, unions and national industrial organizations such as 
the Advertising Council might bear the expense. However, 
there is danger that a single sponsor will bias the infor-
mation. A desirable solution might be to have a program sup-
ported jointly by industry, gover~~ent and the unions. A 
joint sponsorship of this nature would require many compro-
mises by each of these groups, but it could be a step toward 
greater mutual understanding that would be dramatized in a 
national information program. 
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However, such cooperation is not likelv in the near 
future, especially when each of these groups continues to 
hold so many divergent views on the factors responsible for 
a recession. 
Individual business organizations or industrial 
associations are the most lil,ely sponsors. Of course, these 
groups are likely to bias information with a business "party 
line" on the recession. Few businessmen are willing to 
support ideas that are contrary to their personal economic 
philosophies. 
It seems, however, that business organizations, which 
support recession information programs of an objective 
nature, might reap substantial public relations benefits. 
The government and unions could also sponsor similar 
information programs, or programs which better clarify their 
functions in the economy and the contributions they can mal'e 
in alleviating economic recessions. The government role in 
the economy is particularly confusing to many people. For 
example, r.10st people do not understand the purpose of 
deficit spending, according to survey results. They fail to 
comprehend how unemp loYJaent benefits, increased defense 
spending and other government outlays can stimulate business. 
Generally,. they be 1 i eve that such government anti-recession 
actions can only increase taxes. Many people associate 
recession with the necessity for economizing and cannot 
understand how government deficits could contribute to 
increased demand. As Katona notes: 
Scholars and publicists have not yet succeeded 
in clarifying the8function of goverlli~ent deficits among the masses. 
Information can be distributed in many ways but a 
recession information program to reach the masses would 
require using one or more of the mediums of mass communi-
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cations. The selection of the medium or mediums would depend, 
of course, on the nature of the program. 
Television might be an effective medium, considering 
its popularity and its notable success in several documentary 
and educational efforts. For example, a series of hour-long 
shows for several continuous weeks during a recession might 
be favorably received if they were both informative and 
interesting. Such programs could be given greater appeal if 
outstanding television news cormnentators participated and 
leading economists, industrialists, union leaders and govern-
ment figures appeared. A program of this nature might be 
sponsored by the television industry as part of its public 
service contribution. 
Information programs, no matter how extensive or elab-
orate, will not necessarily reverse a recessionary trend. 
Social learning is slow and many people interpret information 
8~.' p. 21]-0. 
in terms of deeply ingrained stereotypes and views.9 How-
8n 0 
ever, the need for greater economic understanding is para-
mount and if consumers are to act so as to favorably influ-
ence the trend of the economy, they need continuing sound 
guidance and direction from opinion leaders. Katona says 
that today there seems to be some value in economic ignor-
ance. '' ••• the little knowledge people have of the workings 
of the economy does not seem to lead them astray frequentl;'}O 
However, he adds that a "little learning" can be "a 
dangerous thing. No doubt, more knowledge and better know-
ledge is preferable to incomplete and unsophisticated 
information. 11 11 
Since recessions happen to be one of the pressing 
problems of this economy, a comprehensive information pro-
gram conducted during a business decline might give people 
greater insights into this problem and the worldngs of the 
economy in general. 
II I. COMPANY PROGRAIV!S 
Company-sponsored programs like "Operation Upturn" and 
"Operation Capaci ty 11 must be evaluated mostly in terms of 
their benefits to the individual concern. Individual corpor-
at ions have only limited powers to influence an economic 
9~., p. 239. 10~ •• p. 233. 11 Ibid. 
trend, either through words or deeds. Even a giant corpor-
ation like General Electric can do very little on its own in 
promoting a general business upturn. 
While in many respects the programs of the companies 
were similar, there were two fundamental differences. Gen-
eral Electric launched its program after company sales had 
dropped, while Hudson 1 s program was more of a preventive 
measure since its sales had not been adversely affected by 
the recession. The programs also differed in size and 
scope. "Operation Capacity" was a relatively small program, 
which extended only to the five plant communities of the 
Hudson Paper Pulp Company. In contrast, 110perat ion Upturn 11 
was an elaborate, large-corporation program, which was 
adopted by General Electric divisions in all areas of the 
United States, and even in some foreign countries where Gen-
eral Electric plants are located. 
Unlike the Advertising Council campaign, the programs 
conducted by General Electric and Hudson Paper were of a 
public relations nature. General Electric did advertise 
"Operation Upturn" extensively to reach a mass audience but 
the company was primarily interested in appealing to specific 
publics, as was Hudson paper. 
It is, of course, difficult to gauge results in public 
relations endeavors like these two companies conducted. Hud-
son reported that sales increased and inventories decreased 
during the period that "Operation Capacity" was in effect, but 
there may have been factors other than the program respon-
sible for these improvements. General Electric officials 
seemed very satisfied with "Operation Upturn 11--one spokes-
man reporting that he believed it was the most successful 
program ever conducted by the company--but they were 
cautious in claiming results. 
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Publicity benefits. Any company which responds to a 
recession with a unique and timely effort is apt to receive 
favorable publicity. Judging from our perusal of newspapers 
and magazines published during the 1957-58 recession, these 
mediums--particularly the business periodicals--will allot 
considerable space to aggressive business actions during an 
economic decline. 
"Operation Upturn" was apparently well received by the 
nation's news media. We discovered a nu;nber of favorable 
stories on the program in our review of publications printed 
during that period. Some publications, such as Business Week, 
carried the "Operation Upturn" story in depth.12 Printer's 
~ reported favorably on "Operation Capaci ty 11 , as did news-
papers in the Hudson plant communities.l3 
By sponsoring these programs, General Electric and Hud-
son Paper received good publicity at a time when most business 
12 11 GE Launches Own Plan for Recovery," 5Jusiness ~' 
(!..lay 17, 19 58) , p. 28. 
13"Hudson Pulp Paper Shows the Way to Beat Recession 
Thinking," Printer's Ink, (June 27, 1958), pp. 56-57. 
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news was bad. And the story probably helped to "polish" 
each company's 11 image 11 since the programs were tangible 
evidence that the companies were not sitting idly by, wait-
ing for the recession to pass--but were, instead, taking 
constructive actions in an effort to offset the ill-effects 
the decline was having, or might have, on their businesses. 
The publicity these companies received for their pro-
grams may have had other beneficial effects. In a small 
way, it may have helped to offset some of the bad news about 
the economy. The General Electric progr&~, in particular, 
generated a number of 11 good 11 news stories, and the name, 
"Operation Upturn", had the obvious implication that the 
company believed the worst of the business decline was over. 
While we have no supporting evidence, the pub 1 i city may also 
have inspired renewed efforts by competitors. Seeing tlla t 
General Electric and Hudson were seeking to capitalize on the 
recession situation, other manufacturers in the respective 
industries may have responded with more aggressive efforts. 
Communications vehicles. The programs of the two com-
panies were, in a sense, effective communications vehicles 
for reaching a nwnber of publics. We have mentioned briefly 
how a mass audience was reached through national publicity on 
the programs. More specific appeals were also possible. 
General Electric, it will be recalled, advantageously 
used its annual shareholders meeting as the occasion to 
.. 
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announce Its program In an effort to enlist support from 
hundreds attending. Hudson sought Initial support from its 
eraployees by first explaining "Operation Capacity, u a pro-
duction oriented progrrun, to Its working force. 
The Hudson appeal to their employees was relatively 
simple--but was a sound recession theme; It was an appeal to 
their workers' desires for wage and job security. 
The company told Its workers how much they could lose 
in wages If company sales fell to the industry level, and 
then explained that a five percent reduction of manufacturing 
costs would enable the company to hire fifty mo!'e salesmen, 
which would enhance sales and insure higher production levels. 
Later company suggestions to employees on cutting costs 
blended with the 11capaclty 11 theme. 
General Electric intensified its over-all employee 
relations effort, using 110peration Upturn" as the catalyst. 
The public and employee relations departments were assigned 
the b!'oad !'esponslbllitles of lnspitlng 11 all employess In all 
functions with a sense of mlsslon 11 and of enlisting "their 
enthusiastic participation" in "Operation Upturn. nl4 The 
prime objective in the area of employee motivation, according 
to company literature on the program, was 11 to help develop a 
feeling of personal responsibility for meeting the high 
14Gene!'al Electric, MemorandUI:l to all Employee and 
Plant Community Relations Representatives on 110peratlon Upturn" 
Planning Councils, (New York: General Electric, IJ!ay 16, 1958), 
6 pp. 
standards of excellence which people expect of General 
£1ectric. 11 15 
General Electric, like Hudson Paper, emphasized 
security in communicating with employees. Employees were 
told that by working more carefully, eliminating waste, 
reducing inefficiency and enhancing any method producing a 
so-called ''extra value'' to the customer, they would make 
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their own jobs--and the jobs of others--more secure. Through 
the program, the company tried, first, to help employees 
better understand the interdependence of sales and jobs, and 
how both depend on how well the customer realizes "extra 
values", and, second, the responsibility of the employed to 
make jobs for the unemployed. The program's internal slosan 
was "Build Sales and Jobs in •58. 11 
To more fully explain how "Operation Upturn" was used 
at the employee level, we include the following abstract of 
a suggestion list for employee relations, which was part of 
the program plan. 
1) Encourage managers at all levels to analyze what 
restrictions they may be placing on performance of subord-
inates. Are employees being given the opportunity to work? 
2) Dramatize competition through lost orders, lost 
man-hours of work. Schedule on-the-floor talks with appro-
priate salesmen. Have customers talk to employee groups on 
what values they want in locally made products and how 
products are used. 
15Ibid. 
3) Publicize costs of various materials. Such 
dramatization may stimulate waste reduction programs. 
94 
1+) Intensify promotion of Suggestion Plan to generate 
increased participation in "Operation Upturn. 11 
5) Schedule periodic "Operation Upturn" meetings to 
re-stimulate employee interest and efforts--and to give 
progress reports. 
6) Give appropriate recognition for constructive par-
ticipation in "Operation Upturn." 
7) Welcome any genuinely constructive suggestions for 
cooperation which are offered by local union officials. 
3) Utilize all available communication media to help 
employees in all functions develop a sense of mission and 
common interest. 
9) Take advantage of every opportunity to weave econ-
omic education and "mutuality of interest" themes into all 
"Operation Upturn" communications programs. 
10) Build a special communication program around "What 
Makes Jobs" and relate it specifically to "Operation Upturn." 
11) Encourage employees to buy now the General Elec-
tric products and other products and services they need--for 
best values and to help build sales and jobs for themselves 
and others in 1958. 
12) Encourage employees to mail literature on General 
Electric consumer products to their friends.l6 
The community relations phase of "Operation Upturn" 
was much like employee relations aspect, in that it was an 
intensification of effort rather than a radically new 
approach. 
The basic theme of "Operation Upturn 11 --building sales 
a.'"1d jobs in 1958--was carried to the community level, as 
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General Electric tried to develop a better business climate 
in plant locations. 
Everyone in the community, said one General Electric 
statement, should be encouraged to cooperate with General 
Electric employees and management in jui lding sales and jobs 
in their location. 
With your encouragement, the press, radio, TV 
and conmmni ty thought leaders, including city, 
state and national government officials represent-
ing your area, and other local businessmen, 
including General Electric distributors, dealers 
and suppliers, can rally around this constructive 
approach to build sales and jobs throughout the 
community. 17 
Hudson also tried to rally corrununi ty support for its 
programs, first by inviting school principals to tour its 
plant as part of the "Operation Capacity" pro9ram, and second 
by sponsoring special 110. C." sales days in plant community 
stores where company products were sold. 
Conclusions. Programs lilw the two reviewed are not 
the solution for all recession problems that a business organ-
ization may encounter, and we do not suggest that every 
business corporation should sponsor similar programs in sub-
sequent business declines. 
We have tried to show in our review that these programs 
enabled General Electric and Hudson Paper to utilize the 
recession situation somewhat to their advantage. Throuch these 
17Ibid. 
programs, the companies dramatized the recession so as to 
rally support from various groups and encourage greater 
collective efforts within their respective organizations, 
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The question, of course, is will people respond 
favorably to such programs, i, e., will behavior be influ-
enced? Will e;nployees offer more suggestions, work harder, 
try to cut costs, etc.? Will customers buy more products? 
Wi 11 management make greater contributions? 
The responses depend on an infinite number of factors 
--the kinds of appeals which are made, individual attitudes 
toward the corporation, the effect of the recession on the 
business and the economy in general and so forth. 
Hudson Paper was apparently most interested in improv-
ing product! vi ty through its program, The company framed its 
appeals mostly in terms of worker interests and the progra;~l 
was appropriately named "Operation Capacity. 11 Since we have 
only 1 imi ted data on the program and on the company itself, 
it is difficult to say how successful their effort to incite 
greater employee efforts may have been. We can say only that 
the program appeal appeared to be sound, being hoth specific 
and simple to com;nunicate. The wori,ers were told exactly what 
benefits reduced production costs would yield (more salesmen) 
and were reminded of what might happen if company sales fell to 
the industry level (reduced wages). 
The General Electric program was ;nore comprehensive but 
its appeals were relatively simple. To reach the ;nan on the 
97 
job, the "extra values" theme was the primary communications 
vehicle. The success of this phase of "Operation Upturn" 
hinged on the company's ability to explain the interctepen-
dence of sales and production to its employees. If, indeed, 
the bulle of General Electric employees perceived this rela-
tionship, they may have extended their efforts. However, 
there are ot~tcr factors to consider. Employees may have 
believed that the customers would not buy more products, even 
if the ''extra values" were provided, Or they have inter-
preted the "Operation Upturn" program as just another propa-
ganda effort to speed-up production. Company literature 
stressed the fact that "Operation Upturn" was a "work smarter", 
not "work faster", program, but employees were no doubt 
exposed to counter propaganda from unions. One General 
Electric spokesman reported that the program was criticized 
by the union. 
The ''extra values" theme also had external implications 
and was an effective way for the company to side-step the 
question of price cuts. The customer was told that although 
he wasn't getting a less expensive product, he was realizing 
such extra values as better worl,manship and better service. 
By trying to promote "extra values" at the sales level, 
General Electric followed a "quality'' sales philosophy. The 
company chose to stress the quality of its products, as 
opposed to cutting prices or offering special sales or other 
baroains to stimulate consumer desires. The company aq;ued 
that price reductions could have bad effects on consuoer 
psychology, since it would give them the impression that 
prices were dropping and they would continue to postpone 
purchases. 
There are many arguments pro and con, but it seems 
that in a marlcet so bountifully stocked with all types of 
constuner durables, price is becoming a very important factor 
in conswncr decisions, particularly durins a recession when 
sales are down and people expect bargains. We will have more 
to say about the general question of price as a stimulant to 
recession buying in subsequent pages. 
In light of recent evidence on price-fixing in the 
electrical industries, it is apparent that General Electric 
was not in position to slash its prices during the recession. 
"Extra values" were about all the company could pro•note dur-
ing "Operation Upturn", and the company oay have had some 
difficulty convincing people that they were actually rcceiv-
mg these intangible benefits in General Electric products. 
As far as technical excellence is concerned, both pro-
crams appeared to be sound public relations efforts. General 
Electric, of course, has the human and financial resources to 
carry through such a program. As a spol-cesman fro;a the General 
Electric Public and Employee Relations Depart;nent said, the 
company did not have to instigate any "crash 11 activities for 
"Operation Upturn," and the program was carried through in a 
fairly routine fashion. Hudson Paper's "Operation Capacity" 
was a less ambitious effort and probably did not entail too 
many extra efforts. 
It is impossible to say with any degree of certainty 
how individual decisions may have been affected by these pro-
grams. We have offered some speculations in these conclud-
ing remari,s, but we cannot furnish much supporting evidence. 
We believe that, at the very least, these programs were use-
ful to both companies in promoting certain public relations 
themes. The programs helped to cast General Electric and 
Hudson Paper in roles of aggressive companies, trying to com-
bat the recession. General Electric, of course, could have 
been forced to ''eat crow'' in the end if the business upturn 
it so thoroughly publicized through "Operation Upturn" had 
fizzled out. 
IV. PRODUCT PRO!.JDTION 
In the openins chapter, we said that public relations 
men can help durinc; a recession by positive suggestions and 
actions for selling company products in a recession economy. 
Later, we discussed some specific promotion efforts. In this 
section, we discuss some basic ideas on the tdnds of business 
actions that may encourage consumer purchases during a 
recession, 
Price cuts. Price reductions are the most direct 
stimulant business can offer for consumer buying. Expected 
100 
price cuts, says Katona, may favorably influence consumer 
attitudes and stimulate buying. Most people believe that 
during a recession they should be able to purchase most 
products for lower prices. 
However, prices continued to rise during the 1957-53 
recession and people neither understood this development nor 
responded to it favorably. People have stereotyped notions 
" 
1118 about price; they believe that what goes up must come down. 
In 1958, though food prices continued to advance, 
many people argued that recession and inflation 
cannot ta!{e place at the same time. They thought 
that business conditions would malce it necessary 
for sellers of automobiles and durable goods to 
offer large discounts and 11 good buys."l9 
With few exceptions, the manufacturers in basic indus-
try were solidly opposed to cutting their own prices, 
al thouch they admitted that high prices in many other parts 
of the economy helped bring on the recession. The automobile 
malcers and appliance manufacturers, in particular, held their 
prices constant throughout the recession.20 
In the absence of price cuts, these companies relied to 
some extent on basic business themes to answer their critics. 
In frequent public statements, representatives of these organ-
izations. noted that wages continued to rise during the recession 
1°George Katona, The Powerful Consur.1er, (New Yorlc: 
McGraw Hi 11, 1960), p. 5-s-;-
19Ibid., p. 230. 
20Geoq;e T. Bookman, 11How Top Bus inessrnen View the Heces-
sion, 11 Fortune, (Apri 1 1958), p. 251•. 
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because of long-term labor contracts. They also cited 
increasing costs of raw materials and heavy tax burdens as 
reasons for holding prices constant. 
Some businessmen argue that price reductions during a 
recession may have ill effects on both consumer confidence 
and spending. They say that when prices start downward, 
people get the impression that business conditions are grave, 
and that they save their money for the 11 bad 11 days they feel 
are sure to come. Those holding this view also argue that 
if people believe prices are moving steadily downward, they 
will delay purchases, anticipating even lower prices. These 
arguments, however, don't seem to have much validity in 
today' s economy, and especially not during the 19)7-58 reces-
sion when price cuts were rare. 
Price reductions, if both timely and properly adver-
tised, seem to be one of the most desirable of all anti-
recession moves by business organizations. With prices con-
stantly on the ascent, people seem to have become more 
conscious of price as a factor in making their buying 
decisions. Price cuts, it seems, should be timed so that 
they are apt to receive the most favorable publicity. For 
example, if auto producers had cut prices when criticism of 
the automobile industry for 11 causing 11 the recession had reached 
its peak, the benefits both in sales and public relations may 
have been considerable. 
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In January, 1958, when the business picture was very 
bleak, one sheet manufacturing company slashed its prices. 
The Wall Street Journal carried the story, which included an 
explanation for the price cut by company vice president • 
•.• price cuts were made to restore confidence in 
the sheet price structure. The sheet market has 
been undermined in recent months by a growing lack 
of confidence in prices and the current cuts will 
make our customers realize instantly that these new 
prices are at a rock-bottom low and that they can 
buy their full requirements with complete confidence.21 
Although we have no statistics on the subsequent sales 
of this corporation, the example which it set seems to be a 
good one. People, it seems, would be more inclined to feel 
that this company's confidence-building attempts were sincere, 
since it was risking capital in the process. Words backed by 
strong deeds usually get more attention than empty slogans or 
"promises" of good things to come. 
Bargains or special sales are a form of price cuts that 
may also elicit favorable consumer responses. We saw in the 
case of the "You Auto Buy Now" campaign that when dealers com-
bined bargains with special promotional efforts, the results 
were highly satisfactory. Temporary price cuts can provide a 
solid base for some excellent recession promotion campaigns. 
Product innovation. New and better products are con-
tinually needed to stimulate consumer buyin>;, and can be of 
2lwall Street Journal, January 21, 1958, p. 2l1. 
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particular value during a business decline. Because of the 
ever-increasing supply of goods--particularly goods of a 
durable nature--and rising incomes, millions of Americans 
now possess products of recent vintage, which are still in 
good condition. We are spealdng primarily of such products 
as household appliances, automobiles and other durable goods 
which require substantial consumer outlays. 
During a recession, we have said, people are more 
hesitant to risl1 income or accumulate long-term credit obli-
gations. They make the old model car do for awhile, post-
pone major appliance purchases. 
Surveys have shown that one of the most effective ways 
to stimulate buying among those having late-model products is 
to offer new features. 
Among owners of relatively new articles, which 
are said to be in good condition, interest in new 
features is an important factor contributinG to 
replacement purchases.22 ~ 
In December, 1957, prior to the automobile slump, the 
proportion of people thinking that the new automobiles dif-
fered greatly from the previous r.1odels was only twenty per-
cent. European economy cars, perhaps, influenced public 
opinion at that time and prompted comments like this one from 
a Harvard economist. 
The new automobiles are inconveniently long, 
inconveniently wide, inconveniently low, wastef~l 
of gas, expensive to maintain, clumsy and ugly. 3 
22George J{atona, .5!1?.· 2J.•, p. 28. 
2Jnoexter Keezer: Advertising and Selling Can Boost 
Us to the Coming Boom," Printer's ~' (!\lay 16, 1958), 
pp. 25-26. 
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The failure of the 1950 models to stimulate consumer 
imagination, coupled with high prices, had serious effects 
on sales and the economy as a whole. 
Price lessens as a factor when a product is really 
desired, but when a manufacturer can combine lower price with 
striking new features, his chances of selling to a recession 
raarket are greatly enhanced. In an earlier chapter, we cited 
the Bell & Howell example, which seemed to be an excellent 
effort to overcome buyer apathy with a new camera at a lower 
price. 
New products cannot only enhance a company's sales 
during a recession, but can also contribute to building a 
better psychological climate if they are promoted extensively. 
If the new product is dramatized as a company response to the 
recession challenge, some people may get the impression that 
industry in general is trying to do sowething about the busi-
ness decline. More important, it may force greater efforts 
and investments by competitors, who may fear losing their 
share of the maritet. 
§_ales_ promotion. Price cuts and new products, while 
highly desirable anti-recession actions, are not often possible. 
For most companies, the problem is how to sell an existing 
product or service at existing prices in a recession sales 
climate. 
lG.') 
Public relations men can assist the sales and adver-
tising force to combat recession psychology by offering fresh 
ideas and intensifying their own efforts that are closely 
related to sales and promotion. 
The basic problem is providing justification for 
"buying now 11 • A basic theme used during the 1957-58 reces-
sion was "buy now to help the economy." This appeal seems 
to have little value. Perhaps if a manufacturer shows how 
his sales can influence jobs in other industries, it could 
have some impact on consumer decisions. (Auto dealers in the 
Pittsburgh area, the steel producing center of the nation, 
ran car ads reading: "We sell steel.") But people usually 
buy because they they need or want a product or service, not 
to help the economy or make jobs more secure. 
Appeals must be in terms of personal interests if they 
are to be effective. Westinghouse advertised its dishwasher 
"for the mother who de serves more time with her family, 11 and 
some recession travel ads read: ''get away from the strain and 
tension. 11 24 
People should be continually reminded of the irreplace-
ability of time in recession pror:Jotions. Money can be re-
gained; time cannot. 
24Philip Lesley, "How to Get More Sales Power from PH 
V/hen ::lusiness is Off, 11 Sale_;! Manag<;:ment, (June 6, 1958), 
pp. 33-35. 
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In addition to sharpening proootion and gearing it to 
the recession situation, efforts to incite actions by inter-
nal publics could be made. 
Shareholders can be appealed to in terms of their own 
interest in continuing profits. Literature with special 
reference to the recession could be prepared to go out with 
quarterly statements. Stocl,holders are important both as 
buyers and salesmen. 
Employees, too, could be encouraged to help promote 
company products by reminding them through an effective pro-
gram of employee communications that larger company sales 
mean more job security. 
Dealer relations programs should also be given special 
attention. Some "extra" efforts to help dealers at the point 
of purchase could be valuable. For example, experts and con-
sultants might be sent out to conduct seminars on how to sell 
in recession psychology. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have endeavored to show that a busi-
ness recession presents an array of special problems, many of 
which seem to have heavy public relations overtones. Our cen-
tral argunent is that public relations can be particularly use-
ful during a contemporary business decline because 1) individ-
ual attitudes may, to a large extent, determine the intensity 
of the decline, and 2) the ways of influencing attitudes 
have become more extensive and complex. We believe that 
the special lmowledge and sldlls of the public relations 
expert can be useful in affecting attitude changes, and 
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that the public relations man can render valuable assistance 
to various organizations during a period of economic 
recession. 
For a variety of reasons, the prestige and influence 
of public relations men have expanded many fold in the last 
decade. Many public relations men enjoy top-level advisory 
posts in industry, government and unions. These men are in 
a position to mal{e their opinions count, i. e., they can 
influence major policy decisions. 
As a specialist in communications and interpreter of 
social and economic trends, the public relations expert is 
expected to advise and direct organizational leaders on 
matters of public significance. These leaders want to !mow 
how their words and actions may affect public opinion, and 
it is often the responsibility of the public relations man 
to supply the answers. 
But what special guidance can a public relations man 
offer durino a recession? 
One of the basic public relations jobs is to make sure 
that policy makers understand the role of attitudes in our 
present economy. lf organizational leaders fail to see how 
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our economic fortunes are influenced by the attitudes of 
millions of people, they are less lili:ely to attach any sig-
nificance to proposed efforts to influence attitudes during 
a recession. 
Economic theorists have been speaking about the role 
of psychological factors in economic recessions for many 
years, and most men in responsible positions are at least 
aware that recessions are both a psychological and economic 
situation. The problem seems to be that a minority of these 
men believe that they have a psychological 11 remedyn for a 
recession. Usually, their so-called recession cures call 
for duping the public with boastful talk or repressed infor-
mation. They argue, as this executive in a letter to a 
noted financial columnist, that bad news intensifies a 
recession. 
11The best war. to treat the downturn is not to 
write about it, 1 pontificates one of the nation's 
leading industrialists in a "confidential letter'' 
to me, and then he adds, 11 You' re taking the risli: 
of scarin~ Reople who have money to buy out of 
spending. 2~ 
We do not suggest that businessmen and government 
leaders should be encouraged to pump out every piece of bad 
news about the economy or their business that can be supp 1 i ed. 
But we do strongly believe that public relations men should 
encourage these opinion leaders to be forthright and facile 
25sylvia Porter, ·~~~e•re Aware of Economy But We're 
Being Insulted," Pittsburgh Post Gaze~, (February 24, 1960), 
p. 11. 
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when spealdng about a recession. J{atona's surveys have 
shown repeatedly that .American consumers, particularly those 
in the broad, middle-income sector, are fairly sophisticated. 
Though their economic knowledge is limited, they seem to 
grasp most of the problems, and are especially alert during 
a business downturn. It is difficult to deceive an audience 
and attempts to do so should be discouraged by public 
relations advisors. 
In the chapter on recession publicity, we discussed 
the President's personal attempt to build public confidence. 
Mr. Eisenhower, it seemed, attempted to draw on his immense 
personal popularity to sway the economic tide. He may have 
firmly believed that the early business upturn he predicted 
was assured, but most business experts freely interpreted his 
comments as an out-and-out attempt to restore business and 
conswner confidence, and that he did not offer a realistic 
appraisal of the economic situation. 
The example seems to illustrate this point: even the 
most popular and influential leader in the land cannot 11 talk 11 
us out of a business recession. Public relations and pub-
licity experts can supply opinion leaders with an arsenal of 
good things to say about the economy. But unless they relate 
directly to the problems the economy is facing, it is doubtful 
that they will have any impact on individual decisions. 
Perhaps the most effective way to insure that indus-
trial and government figures will guard their rem.arl{s during a 
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recession is to remind them of the possible consequences. 
Events can dramatically prove the recession spokesmen to be 
in error. If he says, for example, that recovery is just 
around the corner--and his prediction is subsequently 
proved false--any later statement he Day make on the prob-
lem may weil be ignored, just as with the little boy who 
cried 11wolf 11 too often. Also, the error can be compounded 
by the 1:1ass media if reporters note the inconsistency. The 
spokesmen's presige can suffer, so, too, can the status of 
the organization he represents. 
So far, we have dwelled on the danger of speaking too 
boastfully about the prospects of recovery during a business 
recession. Another set of problems can be created if opinion 
leaders fail to take the initiative at a time of economic 
decline. Businessmen, for example, are sometimes accused of 
being 11 good time" talkers. Say the critics, businessmen are 
anxious to spealt out when the economy is prospering, remain-
ing conspicuously silent when business conditions are not so 
good. 
The public relations man can help to remedy this prob-
lem by encouraging business executives, union and government 
spokesmen to publicly discuss the recession. You will recall 
the Katona contention that consumers are constantly lool-';ing 
for new stimulation, and that they Genuinely want to under-
stand economic developments. The organizational spokesmen 
may not be able to offer any optimistic news such as new 
1 11 
investments, worlwr callbacl{S or increased government 
expenditures. But he might be able to dispel certain con-
swner doubts or misgivings by offering an accurate appraisal 
of the recession and the impact which it is having on his 
particular organization, or the economy in general. 
Opinion leaders must always endeavor to inform and 
educate the people, but their responsibility is particularly 
evident at a time of crisis or uncertainty. None of the 
post-war business recessions could be labeled as catastrophic 
when compared to the 1929 crash, but the 1957-58 dec 1 ine was 
serious enough to arouse concern in many quarters. If 
nothing else, it reminded people that periodic recessions 
are still one of the unsolved riddles of our economy. People 
want and expect leaders of industry, govern~':lent and labor to 
con®ent on the recession--to offer their views and ideas on 
the problem. 
Judging from our review of periodicals and other lit-
erature on the 1957-58 recession, these leaders did a lot of 
talking on the recession subject. However, many of their 
cor:Jinents could hardly be classified as infor;native or educa-
tion a 1. Too often, it seemed, these spokesmen s hlp ly engaged 
in name-calling, unions bl~~ing business for the recession, 
business blaming unions, democrats blaming republicans, and 
so forth. A certain amount of criticism is healthy, a stim-
ulant for new ideas. But the layman, caught in a confusing 
web of claims and counter-claims, has a difficult time 
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discerning the facts of the problem, He may, in the end, 
resolve the conflict by interpretins all their statements as 
propaganda efforts, having little substance in fact. 
The public relations man, by virtue of his position, 
must help proposate certain or~:anizational themes; it is ;1is 
responsibility to see that his client or employer does not 
lose a public relations "advantage" during a recession by 
failing to answer criticism or by not adequately projecting 
his point of view. 
As long as differences of opinion exist between organ-
izations, public relations experts must shape and develop 
basic organizational themes, insuring that they receive wide 
public dissemination. This is a public relations function 
but we do not feel that it should be an end in itself. 
Edward L. 3ernays said that "public relations is a vital tool 
of adjustment, interpretation and integration between indi-
viduals, groups and society.u26 
If public relations is to fulfill its responsibilities, 
it must try to develop enlightened self-interest, discovering 
and pro;:Joting ways for various groups and individuals to act 
in a mutually beneficial manner. 
Rather than encouraging leaders to make constant ver-
bal attacks at other organizations during a recession, public 
26;:;dward L. Bernays, Public Relations, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1952): p. '? 
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relations men could suggest ways for leaders to encourage 
greater cooperation between groups. A recession brings many 
of the underlying problems and differences between groups 
out into the open. What better time to hash out some of 
these differences in a constructive fashion--presenting to 
the public a united front, seeking to find solutions for the 
problems that cause recessions. 
In addition to rendering counsel and assistance to 
opinion leaders, the public relations expert can help by 
instigating actions and programs on his own to favorably 
influence attitudes during a recession. Programs like 
"Operation Upturn" and "Operation Capacity" are dramatic 
examples of public relations involvement in the 1957-58 reces-
sion. Similar programs might be useful for some organizations 
in future business declines. However, the elaborate recession 
program is not the only contribution that the public relations 
man might make to his particular organization at a time of 
econo:nic duress. 
A recession may be the occasion for the public relations 
man to render special assistance to the sales and mariteting 
force of his organization to help overcome buyer apathy. Or 
perhaps he can contribute to a special promotional effort, 
worldng i>1 conjunction with the advertising department or 
agency. 
The pu)Jlic relations raan can pcrfon1 a vital function 
during a recession by insuring that all channels of 
communications are clear. In government departments and 
business organizations he can make special efforts to see 
that all salient information is being received and distri-
buted with equal dispatch. Rapid and accurate communi-
cations to and from the press, decision makers and the 
public and managers and wor!{ers can help to guarantee 
sounder decisions at all levels during a critical business 
period. 
It is, of course, impossible to exhaust all the ways 
that public relations can assist an organization during a 
business recession. So much depends upon the nature of tl1e 
organizations and the specific problems that arise for that 
organization as the result of a recession, that even the most 
general statements do not always apply. 
Public relations is critical to an organization during 
an economic decline only to the degree that the organization 
is affected by adverse business conditions. In limited re-
cessions like the three of the post-war era, some organi-
zations were in no way affected while others had serious 
problems of public relations significance. 
Vlhi le many organizations have in recent years shown a 
real awareness of the importance of good public relations, 
there is no doubt that a considerable number still see little 
value in applying public relations ideas and techniques to 
problems related to business recessions. TI1e leaders of many 
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organizations are apathetic, acceptinG the business reces-
sion as an inevitable consequence of the economic systen, 
and doing only what they feel is absolutely essential while 
they wait for the recession to pass or grow worse. 
If the public relations executive is dedicated to 
the idea that his wori{ is critical when business c$lacks 
off, he will in many instances have to sell the idea to 
others in the organization. To accomplish this £;oal, the 
public relations man must be arraed with keen insight, vol-
uminous infor><!ation, articulate abi 1 i ty and practical ideas 
for handling problems related to the recession when he 
broaches his plan of action. 
The degree to which public relations is involved in 
the problems of business recessions is still somewhat lim-
ited, but we believe that there is evidence to justify 
greater public relations efforts in subsequent business 
declines. Therefore, we feel that public relations plans 
and policies should incorporate ways for dealing with the 
special problems that arise during a recession. With clear-
cut lines of action--flexible enough to meet the particular 
needs of the time--many of the costly errors that occur as 
the result of hasty, unplanned actions miGht be avoided. 
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